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I. INTRODUCTION
The intention of this study is to investigate the cost-
benefit analysis methods used in the creation of voluntary
standards. Economic evaluation was undertaken through a
comprehensive review of the history and evolution of
nongovernmental standards and the current operating
regulations of the major standards organizations. The study
is based upon the assumption that a voluntary standard,
although not complying with the strict definition of the
term, is a public good . As with other public goods,
decisions for their creation and the amount offered for
public consumption are essentially economic. The object,
therefore, of the investigation is to determine from an
economic perspective, whether the process of establishing
standards produces the most efficient results for society
and whether the level of standardization, or the numbers of
standards which exist in society can be considered optimal.
In many ways, standards form the basis for civilization.
They are the definitions, or the agreements on definitions
which make possible the language, the measurement of time,
and the customs. Specific standards for items of production
or consumption are developed by many diverse organizations
for equally diverse purposes. The United States possesses a
significant capacity for developing standards, both public
and private. When set by government agencies, standards
promote the general health and safety of the citizens. When
set by the military, they provide the basis for technical
understanding and efficient acquisition of military hardware
and supplies. In the private sector, standards are
developed through a compUx network of organizations,
voluntarily controlled by a federation known as the American
National Standards Institute. Today there are over 400 such
standards groups operating in ANSI.
Standards, whether established by the government or by
one of the voluntary organizations, can favorably or
unfavorably affect product cost, performance, and
availability. Standards establish, among other things, the
obligations of the buyers and sellers in the market. Much
is written concerning the many benefits which society
receives from standards, yet virtually nothing is written of
the costs of these standards beyond the operational costs
of standards organizations. The budget for the standards
department, the salaries of the engineers and the meeting
expenses are the predominant, identified costs. The greater
potential disbenefits while not ignored, are not fully
evaluated. Only recently has the economics of
standardization for society been explored.
In the study of standards it is quite possible to become
mired in their history and evolution. The majority of the
texts, especially prior to the 1960's, concentrate on the
advances of modern civilization and the relation of specific
standards to progress. The most significant elements of
standardization are highlighted, such as in terchangeab i 1 i ty
,
commonality, or the measurement of time, money, weight, and
distance. Although the background of the voluntary standards
concept is essential for- this study, the reliance on these
early accounts gives no hint of the economic implications.
The methodology of this study will involve first, a
brief history of standards and a discussion of the various
types and functions for which they have evolved. A
framework for 'public goods' evaluation will follow with
basic cost-benefit model alternatives, economic assumptions,
and application or implementation theory. The procedures
used by the major voluntary players will then be analyzed to




1 . Definition of the Concept
The basic concept of standardization is a simple
one. If left at the level of shoe sizes or light bulb
interchangeabi 1 i ty , the study of standards seems elementary
and hardly worthy of economic analysis. The exposure of
everyday life to countless standards developed through
history makes this type of study, while simple and
intellectually mundane, overwhelming nonetheless.
Exactly what standards are, how they affect producers
and consumers, and how they have evolved is not precisely
defined. Nearly every author has his own version of the
reasons behind standards and their role in society, and most
studies of standards begin with the obvious elements of
time, numbers, and language. These accounts somewhat
reduce, however, the credibility of an economic exploration.
After all, attempting to measure the monetary benefit of a
common language seems hardly a prudent effort.
Standards are to a large extent merely definitions or
agreements. They may be used as a basis of comparison, or
they may be accepted for use through authority, custom or
general consent. Primarily, standards communicate a message
efficiently with least ambiguity. Supposedly, they
represent the best cooperative efforts of affected parties
for the common good.
Standards are called 'voluntary', not because they are
developed by volunteers, but because they are adopted
voluntarily and are not promoted by law. The standards of
concern for this study are those created for public
consumption by private organizations with private funds and
used in industry voluntarily.
While the exact definition of a standard is somewhat
illusive, the meaning of standardization is likewise vague.
Originally this study was undertaken to investigate the
balancing of interests and the weighing of benefits versus
costs which were naively believed to be the process. The
comprehensive mathematical models, the in depth discussion
of effect valuations, and the alternative methods for
standards selection were, however, not uncovered.
The literature, regulations, and operating procedures
dealt not with the mechanics of selecting the one best size
or material, but with convincing others that the standard
already developed was supportable. It turned out not to be
a scientific endeavor, but a political one. Standardization
is essentially a political process. It is pragmatic and it
is democratic. The parties which wish to participate cast
votes for standards approval and proposals, submitted as
standards, are massaged into acceptance.
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Because it was approached from an economic, theoretical
base, the modern business of voluntary standards development
was not anticipated in the planning of the research. The
implications of this approval process presented a different
framework for determining efficiency and optimality.
2 . Origins
The standards creation procedures have not always
been as they are today. The reasons behind the evolution of
standards and the process of standardization are basic to
understanding the industrial revolution. The era of mass
production for mass consumption demonstrated that success in
business was irrefutably connected with effective
standardization. While the motivations supporting different
types of standards are diverse, the underlying reason for
voluntary industrial standards is profit enhancement. Other
types of standards, such as Safety or Health have been
affected by government involvement and often public outcry.
Nevertheless, the importance of standards has never been
universally accepted. The fear of stagnation and the
conflict between innovation and standardization have never
allowed the process unchallenged development.
During the 1800's, the rising number of industrial and
household accidents, particularly boiler explosions,
prompted new efforts toward standardization. However, these
advances were only a part of a larger movement and stemmed
from use as a means to assure in t er changeab i 1 i ty of
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manufactured component assemblies. The prospect of larger
scale production, lower costs, wider markets for sale of
finished goods and expanded sources for raw materials
convinced many of the need for standards and simplification
The rise of standardization mirrors somewhat the
accelerated rate of technological advance. Standards more
significantly indicate the need to stabilize technology
after a period of vigorous growth. Whether directed at
material composition or procedural guidelines, standards
reflect the consensus of the interested (involved) parties
and the current level of commonly understood technology.
Through standards, one epoch of research is transformed
into the building blocks for the next. Standards seem to
beget other standards and gain strength from those that
proceed. The c raw 1 - wa Ik- r un stages of the industrial
revolution are also found in the development of industrial
standards. The apparent conflict between standardization
and innovation is, thus, dispelled.
Man is by nature an innovator, but he is also a
s tanda r d i z er , and if he were not, he would not long
survive. An innovation is successful only when it
has become a new standard. (Perry, 1955, pp. 124-125)
While the line between standardization and development
is not always clear, standards nevertheless mark the trail
and at least indicate a direction of further research needs
Technical advances can be chronicled simply through the
International Standards Organization committee's experience
12
during the 1950's, transport facilities; the 1960's,
environment and human safety; 1970's, new energy sources and
fuel supplies; 1976, computers; 1980, data transmission,
networking and interfacing of equipments.
Albert W Whitney, the Chairman of Engineering Standards
Committee said in the 1920's,
Standardization relegates the problems that have already
been solved to their proper place, namely, to the field
of routine, and leaves the creative facilities free for
the problems that are still unresolved. (Reck, 1956, p. 65)
3 . Vol un tary S tandards
The emergence of the voluntary standards system in
the US is curious to the rest of the industrial world. In
most countries the government either develops and issues
standards which are compulsory, or it leaves the
responsibility to private agencies which it may or may not
support financially. The US on the other hand, writes some
of its own standards, allows private agencies to develop
other standards, and promotes some standards in both cases
by law. (Melnitsky, 1953, p. 81)
Normally, however, standards used in the US are simply
documents of convenience, not compulsion. The importance of
a specific standard is not whether it was issued by a
private concern, an association of private companies, or a
national standardizing group. Its value to the society is
in its application. The research effort behind the
standard, regardless of origin, is key.
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In Japan the same type of process for standards
acceptance exists, but with greater intensity. Company
representatives there meet almost continually in order to
map out strategies and to present to the Japanese Government
a unified voice. In the US the process is slow, often with
company representatives meeting only a few times per year.
Hence, the majority of the development work in the US is
conducted by each company individually, and only when the




The question this raises is precisely the focus of the
study. Whether the voluntary standards concept as it now
applies, produces the optimal level of standardization in
society.
Some have argued that the greatest danger lies not from
too many standards as a result of the voluntary system, but
rather too few. Others contend that greater government
( nonr egu la to ry ) involvement is needed. But, most
publications about standardization which were reviewed did
not address any system wide problems. In any event,
systematic economic evaluation of standards development
either for an industry or overall for society has to be
pursued.
4 . S tandardization Examp 1 e s
Most of the historical standards accounts and texts
reviewed for this study were written by persons directly
14
involved in voluntary standards development. The
objectivity of the record overall, therefore, Is suspect.
Appropriate standardization has been credited in these
accounts as a major factor in a multitude of human
accomplishments. In addition, inappropriate or misuse of
standardization has been cited as contributing to some of
man's greatest failures. For example, while some have
argued that the Allied success in World War II was
attributable in part to correct standardization, the
Department of Defense has asserted that premature
standardization by the Germans significantly restricted
their ability to fight effectively. Early in the war, the
German government demanded industry-wide standardization,
".
. .thereby placing the German manufacturers in such an
incongruous position as to virtually compel them to build
the aircraft to conform to the size of the standardized
bearings." (Melnitsky, 1953, p. 2)
Premature standardization and over-specification are
pitfalls in the concept with just as vague a definition as
standardization, itself. Criticism of standards in general
or of the voluntary system are, thus, often focused on
specific inappropriate applications.
In 1974 the Defense Science Board formed a task force to
study and evaluate the standards practices of the
Department. Dr. J F Shea, chairman of the DSB, admitted the
15
board approached the subject with a bias against the body of
some 40,000 specs and standards. The task force, however,
after studying the system, reversed its earlier position and
ended supporting the process with relatively minor
adjustments. The high costs they earlier associated with
standards were found to be the result of misuse and
incorrect employment of certain standards. Nevertheless,
the Shea report did provide the impetus for the 'tailoring'
programs in DOD and did encourage the strengthening of
management and control of specifications in general. (Shea,
1979, pp. 103-110)
Instances where standards have directly produced
noteworthy, monetary results are well illustrated by the
military. The cases below involve better selection of
competing standards, selection of a set of standards in an
environment which theretofore had none, and reduction in the
number of insignificant standards. All can be viewed as
attempts to standardize correctly.
Annual savings of an estimated $5.7 million are realized
by DOD through the selection of an appropriate standard for
motor oil. Instead of using three separate grades,
depending upon the climate, one standard was applied for all
climates. (DSSP, 1986, Case II)
Army tactical shelters inventory, without adequate
standards management, consisted in 1974 of over 200
incompatible styles. The Secretary of Defense directed a
16
study, the result of which was variety reduction to thirteen
types. The average per unit cost of a shelter before
standardization in 1972 was $40,000. By 1984 the average
cost of a standard shelter was $12,300 (in constant 1972
dollars). (DSSP, 1986, Case I)
The Navy was, in the early 1980's, developing a new
aircraft training system, the T-45A. The anticipated Full
Scale Development cost was over $800 million. In 1984 the
Secretary of Defense limited expenditure on the program to
$450 million. After an extensive review effort by the
program management, the FSD contract was awarded for $438
million. Although there are numerous reasons for the price
drop, standards reduction played a large part. A typical
military aircraft references over 6,000 specifications.
After close scrutiny, the T-45A aircraft references less
than 400. (DSSP, 1986, Case IV)
There exists, in the military alone, enough
standardization accounts to dramatize the economic value of
certain specific standards. These examples do not, however,
solve the larger questions of this study and do not lend
support to the exi s t ing
.
leve 1 of standardization in a
project, industry or society. Just because a standard that
is now in use saves money does not adequately answer the
question of whether it is the best standard. Furthermore, it
does not necessarily mean that other standards are not
17
required. Simply Listing standardization successes is
insufficient evaluation.
B. HISTORY
As was stated, the study of standards can too easily
emphasize their history and significant past
accomplishments. Nevertheless, they should be at least
briefly discussed. Standards have always been used to
create order from varying degrees of disorder. The roots of
civilization rest, to a large extent, with the creation and
adoption of standard practices and objects. The language
and the measurement of time were probably the earliest
forms. As far back as 2500 BC , the Pharaoh decreed that the
Egyptians use a cylindrical royal cubit stone as a standard
unit o f measure , theretofore undefined. Some of the
earliest evidence of standardization for interchangeability
of component parts occurred in the 10th Century with the
advent of the Chinese moveable type. (ASTM, 1985, p. 2)
While new efforts continued throughout the years, it was
not until the beginning of the Industrial Revolution that
standardization began to accelerate. In the late 1700's the
French created the Metric system and proposed its adoption
to the British and Americans. Converting the week to ten
days and the month to three weeks, the Metric system which
originally included such calender reform was spurned for a
period after the French Revolution. In fact some of the
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French scientists promoting the Metric system were
imprisoned or executed. (Perry, 1955, pp. 62-63)
In the US the founding fathers were aware of the issues
of standardization and included a statement in the
Constitution (Article 1 Section 8) which gave Congress the
power to "fix the standards of weights and measures." It is
interesting to note that, even in its infancy, the Congress
could not agree on the merits of the Metric system and
refused to adopt it. Understanding the significance or the
importance of standards functions is not, however,
synonymous with recognizing the issues. In 1816, in his
message to Congress, President Madison said in part,
Congress will call to mind that no adequate provision has
yet been made for the uniformity of weights and measures
contemplated by the Constitution. (Burton, 1970, p. 22)
The initial efforts by the Congress toward
standardization dealt with another issue addressed in the
Constitution which was, not suprisingly, uniform taxation
throughout the country.
In 1800 Thomas Jefferson granted Eli Whitney a contract
to produce 1000 muskets for the Army. Mr. Whitney in his
demonstration of the (mass produced) characteristics of his
muskets, dumped a box of parts on the floor of the
legistlature and from them produced several identical
rifles. Standards historians all note this act as
particularly significant and a favorite tale of early
success .
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The major players in the development of standards were,
prior to the 1820's, predominantly politicians or political
regimes. Nevertheless, the US government continued to
contribute, though not in an authoritarian manner.
Other early standards advances usually followed
calamity, while later they were to follow the outbreak of
war. The Boston fire of 1869 gave rise to the standard size
of a brick, because rapid reconstruction was stifled by
building materials' inconsistency. In 1863, Congress, in
attempting to untangle railroad problems, reduced from
thirty three to one the standard widths of railroad tracks.
There are many other such examples.
Most of the remaining historical milestones consist of
the creation of the standards organizations and the birth of
the voluntary system in the US. In 1898 the American
Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM) was established to
address concerns in steel, paint, and concrete. In 1901,
the National Bureau of Standards replaced the Office of
Weights and Measures in the Commerce Department and was
directed to assist in the development of National Standards.
In 1905, the International E 1 ec t r o t echn i ca 1 Commission and
in 1911 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers were
formed. (ASTM, 1985, p. 3)
Soon therea f ter
,
organ i za tions and professional societies
from virtually every product area began to write standards
and procedural guidelines. To accommodate this diversity,
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and to better coordinate the standardization efforts, in
1918 the American Engineering Standards Committee was formed
by 15 engineers, representing five societies (American
Society of Civil Engineers, American Institute of Mining and
Me ta
i
lurg ica L Engineers, American Society of Mechanical
Engineers, American Society of Testing and Materials, and
the American Institute of Electrical Engineers). (Reck,
1956, p. 25)
This represented the first step toward nationalization
of voluntary standards. The work of the committee was
likened to the first compilation of a dictionary. The AESC
was to later become the American Standards Association and
much later, the American National Standards Institute. It
was the intention of this nationalization effort to be a
clearinghouse for independent standards organizations and a
source of standards data.
Historically, simplification activities by these
organizations and the government have reached peaks during
wartime. Variety reduction is almost always the primary
method. The most striking examples came during World War I,
when government action reduced washing machine types from
445 to 18, cut tire varieties from 287 to 32, and completely
eliminated over 5,500 styles of rubber footwear. However,
after wartime controls were lifted, variety proliferation
resumed. (Hemenway, 1975, pp. 22-23)
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In 1920 a more lasting course was set, based upon a
survey report entitled, "Waste in Industry", prepared by the
American Engineering Council of the Federated American
Engineering Societies. The council president, Herbert
Hoover, was to become the champion of voluntary standards
and the architect of the system as it exists today. In that
report it was estimated that more than 307. of the cost of
production and distribution of products in the US could be
eliminated and that $10 billion could be saved annually
through standardization and simplification. (Woolacott,
1985, p. 100) Later, as the Secretary of Commerce, Hoover
instructed the Federal Bureau of Standards Director, Samuel
W Stratton, to take a more active role in the promotion of
commercial standards and simplification practices. Stratton
objected because of the non- sc i en tif ic nature of commercial
standardization.
Stratton has good reason to object, for commercial
standardization is anything but a research problem.
It is loaded with controversies, long range implications,
and hazards. As a scientific agency, the Bureau might
not be immune to political attack, but a scientist can
stand his ground when he has the facts on his side. But
commercial standardization opens up economic and social
questions to which there can be no iron-clad answers.
(Perry, 1955, p. 133)
There exists in this reasoning a decided lack of effort
toward systematic, economic analysis of the process. The
idea that the level of standardization was measureable and
that optimal standards were attainable seemingly does not
exist.
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The cooperative governmen t- indus t ry effort to tackle
waste was later dubbed, "The Crusade for Standardization"
and Hoover was to continue for decades as its leader. In
1951, in an awards acceptance speech before the ASA, Hoover
said in part,
Standards are the base of all mass production. They make
possible more continuous employment. . . . They have
sharpened competition. They have cheapened the cost of
production. . . . Thus, they have been a factor in our
rising living standards. They have enabled thousands of
different articles to be placed within the reach of
everybody. They do not impose uniformity on the
individual, because they make available to him an infinite
variety of additions to his living. (Wollacott, 1985,
p. 100)
The foundation for voluntary standards development is,
thus well established. The noteworthy elements of the
system are the large number of diverse organizations,
working somewhat independently and the lack of central
government control. This environment is unique to the US
and is neither modeled nor well understood abroad. While
there has been little mandatory standardization by direct
legislation, federal control in some important fields has
been delegated to regulatory agencies which issue standards
of many kinds, (ICC, FDA, etc). This is entirely a
different concern and will not be further discussed.
C. LEVELS OF STANDARDIZATION
In keeping with the premise that standardization is not
rigidly defined nor universally appreciated, the types of
standards, the roles they fulfill and the level of
23
standardization are all imprecise. Generally, past
standardization accounts have attempted to divide the
concept into concise categories and yet most have divided it
differently. Probably the important lesson is reaffirmation
of the non- sc i en t i f i c nature of the process.
Standards can be developed on a number of levels. They
can be tailored for varying portions of the (user) public,
or they can be restricted to a specific group or firm. The
difference between those standards written for a small group
and those offered for general consumption is the degree of
consensus that went not into the standards original
development, but rather into its approval. On a most
elementary scale, a standard could fill one of four basic
levels; company, industry, national or government and full
cons ensus .
Through this reasoning, the most technically sound and
credible standards should be those at the full consensus
level. Those standards would have passed the more rigorous
tests and would have satisfied the more diversified
audience. The underlying assumption to this division is
that as the standards move up the ladder of approval, it is
accepted by successively larger, more influential groups.
That is, that the company is always less influential than
the industry, industry is always less influencial than the
government, and so on. This assumption is not always valid.
24
The industry, composed of numerous companies may not always
outweigh the influence of one of its largest members.
Another scheme for dividing standardization into levels
also differentiates them by degrees of consensus. In this
concept, a standard can be (1) a company standard, (2) a de
facto accepted standard, (3) a major voluntary organization
approved standard, or (4) an approved American National
Standard.
While a company standard is not offered for outside
approval or use, a de facto standard exists with a high
enough degree of consensus for wide acceptance without
formal alternative standards investigation. Often this type
of standard comes from an organization or small group,
d
i
spropor t iona 1 ly powerful in the market. They may also be
short-term solutions and results of ad hoc committees of
those groups. They are, nevertheless, not subjected for one
reason or another to general discussion and debate.
Standards which have major organization approval have
often been developed through procedures less stringent than
full consensus. The most demanding test of consensus rests
with the American National Standards. With these standards,
the developers have demonstrated exposure, focus and
consensus of the highest degree. These standards have been
designated as the highest priority with the greatest need
and use. There were an estimated 20,000 standards of
sufficient quality developed by 1978, but only about 9,300
25
were nationally approved. In most cases national consensus
was not attempted nor proven. (NSPAC, 1978, p. 13)
The reasons for some standards attaining higher levels
than others is most often a function of economics. The cost
for generating national consensus is high, (estimated
between $200,000 and $20 million), but the increased value






D. TYPES OF STANDARDS
Within each level of standardization there exists
various types. Again, the lines of division are not rigid,
nor universally accepted. Because a standard can be
designed for such diverse purposes, understanding the reason
behind its writing is the most important step. The American
Society of Testing and Materials defines six types of
consensus standards; test methods, specifications,
practices, terminology, guidance, and classification. (ASTM,
1985, p. 4)
Test method standards delineate procedures for
identification, measurement, and evaluation of qualities,
characteristics or properties of a product or service. A
specification sets requirements to be satisfied by a product
or service. A standard practice is a definitive procedure
for performing an operation that does not produce a test
result. Standard terminology defines terms, symbols
26
and acronyms and creates meaning for the language. A
standard guide offers a series of options or instructions
but does not give a definite course of action. Finally, a
classification is a systematic arrangement of materials,
products or services.
From these types more specific ideas have been offered.
When dealing with a certain product, a standard can be one
of quality or uniformity. Quality grades and rates have
been established for many commodities. Characteristics of
different types of standards can be combined to provide even
more broad notions such as Safety Standards or Codes.
Consisting of compilations of design rules, material and
product minimum requirements, inspecting, testing, and
operating procedures, these codes provide, among other
things, life and property protection. Still other standards
can be directed at interaction between people and machines,
such as a typewriter keyboard or a traffic light.
Again, the reasons behind applying different types and
combinations of standards to commodities and services is, to
a large extent, economic. Grading, for instance, can help
firms lacking in differentiation advantages and generally
tend to decrease the value of established reputations and
trade names. More dominant firms possessing certain product
differentiation advantages, therefore, tend to resist
attempts at product or service grading. Major paper
27
companies and tire manufacturers are key examples.
(Hemenway, 1975, p. 60)
The most widely recognized distinction among types of
standards is between Performance and Design. Performance
standards are the criteria for product or service operation
and function. Design standards, on the other hand, enable
exact reproductions of an item which will result in an
identical and interchangeable product. Although the
distinction between the two has not been made for very long,
it is nevertheless, the most widely cited.
First promoted in 1967 by Dr. J Herbert Holloman, then
acting Undersecretary of Commerce, the idea of writing a
performance, rather than design standard was intended to
widen participation of producers in the market. (Mackay,
1985, p. 79) The ingenuity of engineers is believed
threatened by strict design specifications. Virtually every
user and developer of standards recognizes this.
The US Congress passed in 1980 the Regulatory
F lexibi li ty Act and 0MB issued in 1982 Circular A-119. Both
of these were aimed, at least partially, at the
design/performance distinction. The US Navy addresses the
issue in the Navy Program Manage r s Guide .
The Program Manager must ensure that the functional
baseline configuration accurately reflects the needs of
the Navy. However, it should be broadly defined, thus
allowing the contractor the necessary latitude to use
innovative technical and production approaches. (Navy
Material Command, 1985, p. 4-29)
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In addition, the Department of Defense Mi li tary Standard
and Mi li tary Specif ica t ion Manual states, "Specifications
shall describe the item in a manner which will encourage
maximum competition. Insofar as practicable, requirements
should be in terms of performance." (DMSSO, 1985, p. 7)
The reasoning for the distinction for the military can
be taken one step further. Design standards developed by
the government shift the risk of the end product operational
capability almost totally away from the producer.
Performance standards, however, leave that risk with the
producer and presumedly lower the acquisition cost of the
specified it ems
.
Other organizations have yet different reasons for
promoting performance over design standards. Robert B
Minogue, the former Director of the Office of Nuclear
Regulatory Research for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission in
1983 stated:
We should not issue performance standards if they are
structured in such a way that they mandate a particular
design approach. In the first place it is not our
business to design the plants and activities we regulate.
(ASTM Seminar, 1983, p. 29)
The Underwriters Laboratory publication, outlining the
methods of standards development very clearly states, "UL
makes every effort to use performance requirements and to
avoid construction requirements that tend to limit design."
(UL, 1983, p. 10) The potential cost of inappropriate
29
standardization, through the over use of design
specifications, therefore, seems to be widely recognized.
The positive aspects of performance standards are
improved flexibility, innovation and competition,
potentially lower cost, and lessened likelihood of anti-
trust violations. Nevertheless, not all instances are
equally suited for performance specification. Again, the
reason can be economic. The cost of writing a performance
specification can be very low, but its application cost can
be very high. A performance criteria may, for instance, be,
'a door must provide security.' It is often difficult to
develop a test to determine conformance to such a vague
standard. Secondly, a performance standard must often be
written in terms of performance to be evaluated through the
conduct of specific tests. The performance is not often
judged in the actual use environment. Test equipment can be
expensive and difficult to construct.
Therefore, at the very least, performance and design
specifications should not be viewed as opposites, but rather
as complementary methods of standardizing. Further, while
the costs of o ver -
s
pec i f ica t i on in design are potentially a
factor, the same applies to the costs of evaluating
pe r f o rmance
.
The division of standards into various levels and types
is indicative of the complex nature of the process. None of
the concise categories is exclusive, nor are they, as in the
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case of performance and design, necessarily opposing. As
the layers of standards are added (standards citing other,
existing standards), the distinctions between types and
levels are even more blurred. The economic implications and
motivations can, however, be more easily viewed through
categorization efforts.
E. ROLE OF STANDARDIZATION
Although the process is political, the role of
standardization in an industrial society or the reason for
its exercise is essentially economic. The economic pressure
comes from several directions. In his illustration of the
chief advantages of standards, H W Robb, the former company
standards manager for General Electric, said in 1956:
They (standards) serve to notch up, consolidate,
communicate, compare and measure our progress. They are
a means to simplify practice, to coordinate and conserve
effort, and to help utilize more efficiently our
knowledge and resources to the best advantage. They
liberalize man hours that otherwise are engaged in
constantly reinventing the wheel. To us in industry they
are essential to increase economy, and productivity, to
cover costs and hence provide more goods and
services. . . . (Reck, 1956, p. 295)
1 . Manag emen t
Standardization can be considered a management
function designed to coordinate individual decisions with
the objective of optimizing diversity in the industry or
firm. This is a diversity of materials and practices. The
language of management is money and from that follows
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standardization efforts. This realization for managers as
well as analysts of the concept is essential.
While most attention is paid to materialistic aspects,
such as part dimensions, or test methods, over 50 years ago
L.P. Alford stressed a wider recognition of the concept in
terms of scientific management. As Frank and Lillian
Gilbreth had earlier expressed, scientific management was a
search for 'the one best way' . Alford began his analysis by
stating four laws:
(1) LAW OF SPECIALIZATION
Subdividing work so that one or very few
operations can be assigned to a worker improves
the quality and increases the quantity of output.
(2) LAW OF DIVISION OF EFFORT
Assigning to each worker one or a very few operations
that he is better adapted to perform improves quality
and increases the quantity of output.
- COROLLARY
As the scope of a manager's responsibility is
narrowed, his efficiency is improved.
(3) LAW OF TRANSFER OF SKILL
The attention and skill required to use a
tool or operate a machine is inverse to the
skill transferred to the mechanism.
(4) LAW OF SIMPLIFICATION
Concentrating upon the manufacture of a single
product tends to improve the quality and lower
the production costs.
Standards, by this reasoning are criterion of
management, as well as quality, performance, or practice.
All are used as a basis of comparison. Fundamental to this
role is the relation of standards to control; budgetary,
production, quality, etc. In fact, management is often
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evaluated by its ability to govern, direct, regulate or





Variety reduction is often cited as the single most
important function of standards. In fact, an estimated 80 7.
-
907« of all government standards were developed for that
purpose through two separate avenues; reduction in varieties
of goods and practices in existence, and restrictions on
variety growth. (DSSP, 1986, p.A-1)
Reduced numbers Of items of production allow for longer
production runs and lessened inventory demands. From these
advantages, other benefits flow. Lower production set up
costs and operation farther down the production 'learning
curve' are good examples. More specific analysis of the
benefits will follow in Chapter III.
In restricting further variety growth, the US Navy in
the Program Managers Guide states;
The Program Manager should make maximum use of existing
Navy standard hardware and software. Use of standard
materials and procedures lead to life cycle cost
benefits, higher reliability and established logistic
support base, simplified training, proper documentation.
(Navy Material Command, 1985, p. 4-79)
3 Product Quality
Beyond variety reduction, other functions of
standards are emerging. Improved quality control and
product safety are the focus of these efforts. Quality
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standards exert two positive influences. First they tend to
better specify the characteristics of products and allow
more accurate comparisons of quality in the marketplace.
Second, quality standards may serve to improve the quality
or performance by better specification of test procedures.
With respect to the comparative shopping attributes of
quality standards for the individual firm, customer pressure
is becoming a dominant motivator for standardization.
Compatibility and Interface are the new buzz-words of
marketing strategy significance. Customers, including the
US Government as perhaps the largest customer, are
increasingly demanding voluntary standards utilization
because of its effect on efficient consumption. Buyers are
demanding greater knowledge of ingredients and performance,
as measured in terms of standards.
In analysis of a competitive economic environment,
several assumptions are usually made. Homogeneous products
and perfect consumer information are two of those
assumptions directly tied to efforts of standardization.
The greater the degree of standardization across products,
the better informed consumers will be and the more easily
attributes of these products can be compared. Quality
standards fill this role.
An excellent example of the importance of standards and
the effect they may exert in the market through improved
quality can be viewed through the US semi-conductor industry
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experience in the early 1980's. The other significant
aspect of the example is the dramatization of the problems
which may arise if standards are not updated and reviewed.
In 1979 the US semiconductor industry, was becoming
alarmed by the rapid rise of Japanese competition. The US
companies were at that time relying upon quality standards
techniques which were almost twenty years old. A study in
1979 by Hewlett Packard found that Japanese 16k DRAMS were
10 times less likely to fail than semi-conductors made in
the US. This spurred extensive quality standards review.
By 1980 the imported items were 6 times less likely to fail
and by 1982 the two were equal. (Semiconductor Industry
Association, 1985, p. 21)
There are substitutes for quality standards which may
differentiate the products in their absence. These are
brand name and price. While they may well represent the
predominant factors of consumption or selection of items in
the market, not all agree to their value or efficiency as
Arthur Kallet, Director of the Consumer Union, states;
Perhaps someday a market place more rational than today's
will permit the consumer to rely on those widely offered
substitutes for quality standards: Brand Name and Price.
If the work of the consumer goods testing agencies has
proven anything, however, it is that in the present
market neither of these substitutes is a reliable one.
(Reck, 1956, p. 275)
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4 . Safety
Closely related to product quality is the role of
promoting product user welfare. Although improved product
safety has been the purpose behind a few standardization
efforts since the boiler explosions of the 1800's, it was
not until the 1960's that consumer product safety really
began to gain momentum. The increasing threat of government
action to regulate and require safety was perceived by
producers and was, to an extent, thwarted through the use of
voluntary standards. Government, in response, accepted many
such standards and made them mandatory.
Some organizations, such as Underwriters Laboratories,
were formed by private companies to specifically address
safety (in this case by the Electric and Insurance
industries). Again, economic necessity brought the change.
Today, UL with a staff of over 3100 is the largest not-for-
profit safety oriented organization in the world. In other
cases, agencies of the Federal Government were established
to define safety in products and practices and to develop
standards which promote it. George P Larrick, former
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration:
In a large sense, the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
in its entirety is a standard--a broad outline of the high
responsibility that must be assumed by those who handle
commodities the who 1 e s omenes s and integrity of which are
essential to public welfare. (Reck, 1956, p. 174)
Safety standards as products of a voluntary system are
indicative of development of standards in general and well
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illustrate the economic trade-offs. Accidents from the use
of products or services are not limited to chance failure.
Rather they are the outcomes of conscious quality and design
decisions. Arthur Johnson, former Chairman of the Standards
Council for the American Standards Association, expresses
the cost/benefit analysis: "Where the one best way reduces
the risk, but increases the cost out of all proportion,
something less than the best way can be agreed upon as a
compromise." (Reck, 1956, p. 149)
Jack Bono, President of Underwriters Laboratories
expands: "Reasonable is a term that is applied. ... It
means that our staff appreciates the balance between safety
and function, safety and practicality and safety and
economics." (UL 1984 Annual Report, p. 3)
F. INFLUENCES ON THE PROCESS
Some of the major influences on the voluntary
standardization system which are currently affecting its
performance and directed efforts are increased consumer
awareness, increased foreign competition, more advanced
technologies and expanded government reliance. Although
overall consumer awareness has significantly increased in
the past decade and has caused firms to better standardize,
the other factors in the world economy have had an equal if
not greater influence. The dominance once held by the
US in terms of manufacturing volume has long since
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evaporated. Today approximately 7 07» of all goods produced
in the US have a foreign competitor. (ASTM Seminar, 1983,
p. 24) At the same time world wide standardization efforts
have widened. The ever increasing technical complexity of
end products is also causing heightened use of standards.
Raw materials, component parts and subsystems are all
subject to much more refined definition in advanced
technologies than in the past. In brief, the demands placed
upon the voluntary system are growing, as the pressure from
foreign competitors are making success more tenuous and
failure more costly.
In addition, the government has come to rely on the
voluntary standards to such a great extent that the dividing
line between law and volunteerism is blurred. In 1964 a
standard developed by the ASTM was the subject of an
a sbe s to s - cemen t price fixing suit, but received the




Because of the heavy reliance of the Federal, State and
Municipal governments upon ASTM for specifications, the
Society may be regarded as an essential arm or branch of
the government. (Hemenway, 1975, pp. 10-11)
In a more general sense, the major impetus for
standardization almost always comes from buyers and is more
likely to be opposed by sellers. Because standardization is
a political process, the more interests which are involved
in the deliberations and debate, the less likely is the
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collective efforts' culmination in a useable output. As the
number of participants, either buyers or sellers, increases
the likelihood of effective voluntary standardization
diminishes. That is, if the market for a particular product
has few buyers, there is a high probability that standards
for that product will eventually be set. If, on the other
hand, there are very large numbers of buyers, the
probability is low. The result is that almost all voluntary
standards in the US exercise control over producers' rather
than consumers' goods. The absence of voluntary standards
for final goods is largely due to the difficulty in
organizing consumer interest. (Hemenway, 1975, p. 18)
In a typical industry where there are few manufacturing
firms, many suppliers of raw materials, and many customers
for the finished product, the few manufacturing firms may
provide inconsistent, though entirely rational, support for
standardization. As buyers of raw materials, the few firms
are likely to organize and collectively impose
standardization upon the many suppliers who will resist.
However, at the same time those few firms are likely to
oppose standardization pressures from customers. Those
firms presenting products to the market may find lessened
competitive advantages and decreased managerial perogatives
with the existence of standards.
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In a market of few sellers, standards can be used in an
opposite approach. Establishment of standards in such
instances can restrict entry of other sellers to the market.
These few firms can then exert d i s pr opor t i ona 1 influence and
make agreements on price/quantity structures that yield high
industry profits.
There are other reasons for some firms' reluctance to
effectively standardize. One of the major constraints of
standards has been and continues to be upper level
management's understanding of its role and significance.
The misconceptions here can be in both directions: lack of
valued appreciation or over confidence in a standard's
ability and business worthiness. Fear that standards denote
regimentation, curtailment of materials construction, and
limitation of design and imagination has further limited the
growth of standards, especially consumer goods standards.
Nevertheless, despite the negative influences, the role
of standards in the modern economy remains an important one.
Appropriate standardization is a positive force in
management, product variety control, quality and safety.
With its changing complexion, the world economy tends to
rely more on standards today than the economic structures of
the past. Increased consumer awareness is advancing
standards acceptance beyond the producer level. Finally,
while the importance of effective standardization is not
universally viewed, the final test of any standard produced
40
by the voluntary system remains the degree to which it is
accepted and used without external pressures.
G. RECENT EFFORTS
A significant modification to the voluntary standards
mechanism occurred in 1982 with the issuance of the OMB
Circular A-119. The circular established formal
governmental policy concerning voluntary standards by
requiring all agencies to (1) rely on voluntary standards
whenever feasible and consistent with law, (2) participate
in voluntary standards organizations when such is in the
public interest, and (3) coordinate participation with
standards bodies to make the most effective use of
government resources. The policy was directed mainly at
those agencies of the federal government which used or
created standards for products' acquisition.
The proclamation, though significant as a formal policy
statement, was merely recognizing reality. Prior to
issuance, over 100 NBS personnel already were participating
in ASTM. Over 1400 Federal employees worked on ASTM's
technical (standards writing) committees. In fact, seven
Federal employees had even been past Presidents of ASTM.
(ASTM Seminar, 1983, p. 13)
The strength of the voluntary standards organizations
has long been realized by government writers. Because of
the guidance of A-119, more of the private standards are
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being incorporated into the government standards inventory.
The number of private standards adopted by government
increased from 939 in 1979 to almost 3500 by 1984.
Further, an independent assessment of Defense
standardization practices in 1984 found that "DOD makes good
use of appropriate standards developed by nongoverment
organizations. . . . " (Toth Associates, 1984, p. 2-2)
If one assumes that increased government participation
in a nonr egu La tory fashion benefits the voluntary system as
well as government standards writers, A-119 is wise. Not
one article was uncovered in this research which indicated
any dissaproval of the policy statement. Government writers
expressed benefits in terms of reduced standards development
costs and reduced prices of procured items. Private
industry writers stated benefits in terms of greater ease of
business conduct with the Federal Government and reduced
production cost of articles for military procurement.
The cooperation between government and industry or lack
thereof has a profound impact on the ability of the two to
trade in the market efficiently. Circular A-119 represents
a significant step, according to almost all standards
*Data obtained from an interview with Andrew Certo,
Director for Standardization and Commercial Acquisition
Policy Division, Defense Material Specifications and
Standards Office, Department of Defense, 27 February 1986
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writers, toward promoting a cooperative environment. The
government, through A-119, does not promote voluntary-
standardization by making the created standards mandatory,
but it does offer the resources of the government for joint
standards development in the public interest.
A major issue facing the voluntary standards
establishment which has yet to be adequately addressed is
the speed of standards development. The traditional
practices of standards organizations, where deliberation on
a specific standard can take months, appear outmoded in the
era of computer aided design. As was briefly mentioned, the
Japanese meet this demand and placate the urgency through
constant development efforts. The American National
Standards Institute is a very large organization. Thus,
they are burdened with similar problems associated with any
large, well established organization. They are deliberate,
but they are slow. A very certain amount of "end runs'
around the bureaucracy weakens the legitimacy and the
national character of the system.
This difficulty for ANSI is compounded with the rapid
rate of technological advance. As standards are applied to
emerging technologies, the dividing line between
standardization and development blurs. While an efficient
standards effort at the frontier is essential to achieving
standardization optimality, the premature application of
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standards is one of the greatest dangers facing the
standards developer. If the process of standardizing fails
here, it fails for the system. The level of standardization
which brings the greatest net benefits to- society is not
likely to be attained if the foundation of the economy
(research and development) lacks efficient standardization.
The organizations within ANSI have, however, addressed a
closely related problem. As the complexity of items of
production increases the probability of achieving efficient
standardization for those items falls. The ability of any
organization to write effective standards for any item
decreases as the level of sophistication increases. If a
system is composed of several subsystems, each composed of
several components, made of hundreds of piece parts, the
first effort of standardizing had in the past always begun
at the bottom. Standards for parts were developed, then
components, then subassemblies. The result, however, from
this process was incompatible systems. A blueprint for
vertically integrating development, beginning at the top,
not the bottom, was needed.
Modeling is the term used within ANSI for the process of
vertical integration of standards development: Networking
systems, then developing subsystems and piece parts to
accommodate the broader guidance. Further, a not for profit
organization called the Corporation for Open Systems, has
recently been established in an effort to better standardize
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across computer systems. Computer equipment incompatibility
is today one of the largest headaches for the industry.
Greater cooperation, possibly brought about by increased
government involvement, it is believed would accelerate the
industry and would free resources of the companies involved
to faster innovate.
Therefore, the problems of system complexity,
interoperability, and rapid technological advance are all
closely tied. These are the great challenges facing the
system. While the role of government in support of the
voluntary system is complicated by these issues, many
standards advocates believe that the quality of standards
created, and thus the long-term success of the voluntary
standards mechanism will be determined by adequate, but well
directed government involvement and endorsement.
H. GOVERNMENT PARTICIPATION
As has been stated, US government involvement in the
creation of industrial standards has always been minor, and
until OMB A-119, ill-defined. While agencies purchasing
products have tended to write their own standards when
adequate private standards did not exist, in general they
-Data obtained from an interview with Marco Negrete,
Director of Corporate Standards for Hewlett-Packard, and a
member of the Board of Directors for ANSI, 7 March 1986.
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have not extended this practice beyond their own acquisition
needs. In 1968, of the over 14,000 industry-wide standards
which existed, less than 37« had been written under
government auspices. (Hemenway, 1975, p. 81)
Nevertheless, concern over the participation or lack
thereof in the standardization process has long been voiced.
There have been several formal studies conducted to assess
the government's performance in this area.
In 1977 the Energy Research and Development
Administration commissioned the National Bureau of Standards
to prepare a comprehensive standards development plan. The
plan was intended to provide assurance that the introduction
of new energy technologies would not be hampered by
inadequate government involvement.
NBS first examined the system in operation and concluded
that voluntary standards bodies:
.are performing this complex task with relative
efficiency and expertise. Where criticism has been
directed toward them, it is frequently, if not always
attributable to the failure of the appropriate federal
agencies to provide the necessary technical support and
coordination. . . . (Steiner, 1979, p. 9)
The standards development plan created and then adopted
by NBS was based upon three general principles.
(1) The standards to be developed must play an
anticipatory role. In some instances this role
involves the use of standards to stimulate
development of technology. In other instances it
shall direct the course of technical development.
In both cases it should facilitate the transfer of
technology in the private sector.
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(2) Voluntary standards must continue to play the
critical role at the heart of the standardization
system by achieving consensus on specific standards.
(3) The system of standardization must be as simple as
possible. (Steiner, 1979, pp. 1-2)
Therefore, while government departments such as DOD did
not, until A-119, have a clear standards policy, NBS has
pursued a well guided course of assistance and support. In
addition to emerging energy technologies, the compatibility
of systems issue discussed above provided an important area
for NBS to carry out this function. Another study,
conducted in 1983, provided further justification for this
type of government involvement.
John H Young in the introductory section of his study,
Effect of S tandards on Ini orma tion Techno logy R &^ D
,
produces an excellent foundation not only for evaluating
present standardization activities, but also for guiding
future efforts or funding. Young divides the technology of
industry into proprietary and nonproprietary elements.
Nonproprietary elements include the general scientific and
engineering principles that underlie an industry's
technology. While the use of nonproprietary elements does
not give any competitive advantage, the market competition
does provide the impetus for developing proprietary elements
based upon those general principles.
Further, while there may be gaps in the knowledge base
needed for this proprietary element development, competing
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firms are believed to systematically underinvest in
developing the nonproprietary class of information. (Young,
1983, p. 15)
.advances in proprietary products and production
processes draw on the nonproprietary pool of information.
Thus there may be a role for the government to support
research in advancing the nonproprietary elements of an
industry's technology. (Young, 1983, p. 2)
The National Bureau of Standards' Institute for Computer
Science and Technology assumed this task of coordination and
technical base support. The Corporation for Open Systems,
briefly discussed in the preceding section is a private
effort, aimed at coordinating the proprietary side of the
technology. The potential achievements of such an
undertaking are, however, restricted by the encroachment
into the competitive arena.
Nevertheless, despite these and other studies (including
NSPAC), the continued involvement of NBS in support of this
technical base is not guaranteed. Specifically, the
proposed budget for ICST for FY1987 was cut in half in an
attempt to trim the federal budget deficit. If such funding
cuts are carried out, the government's involvement in the
voluntary system will diminish even further and place even




While the intention of Chapter II was to present an
historical background and to discuss the- role of standards
in society, this Chapter is intended to illuminate the most
obvious non- eng ineer ing problems which confront the
standards developer. This Chapter is constructed to
demonstrate the need for economic analysis and justification
on two le ve Is - - f irs t , for the firm (micro), and secondly
for society (macro). The costs and benefits of a standard
must be identified and weighed by the firm or organization
which creates it. In addition, and just as significant, the
costs and benefits of a standard must be identified and
weighed for society. The number and variants of standards
which exist in society, or the overall level of
standardization, is an important topic, though not widely
addressed in either the standards or economic literature.
The premise of the discussion is that the positive and
negative effects of a standard can and should be measured
and that, through systematic comparison of benefits and
costs, optimal standards decisions are possible. The firm
will select the standard which produces the greatest
monetary return to it. Society will prefer the mix of
standards (and non- s tandar d s ) which produces the greatest
social well-being.
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While this Chapter is intended to present a framework
for such analysis, it is not comprehensive and does not
reflect every method of measuring and comparing
alternatives. Nevertheless, this Chapter does provide a
basis for viewing standards from other than an engineering
perspective. It is a preliminary investigation. The final
chapter of this study will more specifically describe the
operations of several major standards organizations in order
that an evaluation of their performance based upon this
chapter's suggested analysis is possible.
A. WHY ECONOMIC EVALUATION FOR THE FIRM?
The creation and implementation of standards both
requires the use of scarce resources and affects the users'
resource allocation. Therefore, an economic evaluation is
required for an individual firm, or more specifically for
the standards department within that firm. The standards
department competes for budget funds against other
departments of the organization, and therefore must justify
its expenses. Further, within the standards department, the
expenditure of funds must not only be effective but
efficient.
Some standards can be quite costly to create and use,
yet contribute little to the firm financially. Other
standards may cost little, yet produce significant savings
or substantially promote sales. Identification and
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measurement of the effects is therefore of prime importance
to the f i rm
.
Given the historical significance of standards as
presented in Chapter II, a manager of product development in
a firm will undoubtedly demand correct standardization of
his new items. But at the same time that manager will not
blindly allocate money to standards creation without
evidence of the resultant value. Thus, competition within
the company for budget dollars will require evaluation of
standards' effects, even if that evaluation is crude and
non-systematic: The greater the competition, the greater the
pressure and the more thorough the study.
The dilemma, faced by the standards manager, is two-
fold. First, he must select which standards to develop and
second he must determine how to measure a standard's worth.
In any project there exists various options of
standardization effort. Each costs and produces benefits of
varying amounts.
A standards manager must judge which area to standardize
on the basis of the advantage it gives him in support of his
department's funding before the corporate leadership. A
standards manager should, following this reasoning,
concentrate on standards which will produce the most
noticeable monetary effect in the end product. If a
standards manager can successfully demonstrate the value of
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his efforts, he should be supported through continued
funding
.
Each standard has its day in court. The judge is a
hard-bitten executive, hands on corporate purse strings,
eyes filled with anything but sympathy, and ears open only
to the reply to his question: Why should I spend money on
standardization? (Melnitsky, 1953, p. 17)
Another management decision for the firm concerns what
type or what consensus level standard is best suited for a
particular situation. The intended purpose of a standard
will determine whether its use will be restricted to the
company or offered for consensus generation outside. By far
the vast majority of all standards used or developed by a
firm will be for internal use only, and very infrequently
will standards developed by a firm become industry wide or
national standards. Most firms will never produce a
national design standard.
Most standards used by a firm will be internally
generated and applied operating or test procedures and will
have limited applicability outside. Many will be particular
to a firm as a management prerogative and will, to a certain
extent differentiate the firm and its products.
Development of a product design standard by an
individual firm will be the result of company deliberations
at various stages of a product's invention and introduction
to the market. The business strategy, the architectural
design of the product and its market evaluation are all
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considerations which affect a standard's application and
scope .
A standards manager making these decisions is Likely to
be an engineer with experience in product design or
production. Nevertheless, the financial justification for
his efforts may require an expertise outside his own.
Specifically, the selection of which standard to pursue may
be based upon considerations of end product marketability or
logistical suppor tab i 1 i ty
.
In 1928 this fact was pointed out by N F Harriman:
Engineering and technical experts have a proper place
in any standardization program, but economic factors
should be considered at least equally. (Melnitsky, 1953,
p. 113)
A standards manager must, therefore make his first
decision, which standard to develop, by examination of the
likelihood of success times the benefit he believes will
accrue from the standards existence. The first portion is
engineering and the latter is economic.
If a standards manager cannot justify his efforts in
monetary terms, he may face budget cuts or (worse) upper
management's loss of confidence. Few business leaders will
accept standardization expenses because of their intrinsic
value or contribution to the common good. Hard data will
likely be required eventually.
A failure, however, to demontrate the fruits of the
standards may not be indicative of the actual effect.
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Valuation of the benefits, many of which will be realized by
persons far removed from the production line, represents the
second but probably greatest difficulty faced by the
standards advocates. Again the issue of technical
competence, particularly in marketing or logistics, may be
va lid.
Standards groups in and out of profit-seeking
organizations have faced this problem for decades. If
justification of standards expenditures does not rest, at
least in part, on specific monetary savings, the spending
body will probably not support it. If the sum allocated to
the standards department is relatively insignificant and the
company overall is doing well, support may continue. But
the demand for standardization (without obvious cost
avoidances or increased revenues) is very elastic. If the
available money diminishes or the cost of the standards
department rises, the level of funded support will fall
disproportionately. A standards department which does not
adequately justify its existence is likely to be one of the
first targets in a company cost cutting maneuver.
A lack of commitment and the suspicion of the value of
standards is somewhat of a self-fulfilling prophecy. If a
standards body does not substantiate its results, its
ability to affect significant further results is cut.
Sometimes even when solid cost savings estimates are
available, they are disregarded.
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In 1980 the Department of Defense established the Joint
Services Review Committee to investigate the feasibility of
standardizing tactical avionics subsystems. They identified
five potential candidates and estimated a cost avoidance of
$770 million. They requested $64 million to fund the
standardization effort, but they received only $21 million
over three years. The GAO report which detailed this
situation stated the project was doomed to failure, not
because it was infeasible, but because of the lack of top
management commitment and the funding instability. Over the
last ten years there have been three separate high level DOD
studies and three separate GAO studies, all recommending
greater participation in standards activities and programs.
Yet, no program during that period was implemented and
adequately funded. (GAO 10 July 1984 Report to SecDef, pp. 3-
15)
In 1952 Congress passed the Defense Ca ta loging and
Standardization Ac t which DOD followed in the creation of
the Defense Specification and Standardization Program (DSSP)
and the Defense Material Standardization and Specification
Board (DMSSB). Neither of these organizations has ever been
given high priority in funding or operation. The DMSSB
fizzled completely in the late 1970's and failed to even
meet again until 1981. While there has been lip service to
standards activities, policies and objectives, there has
been little enforcement, inadequate funding and insufficient
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top level attention to obtain the potential benefits. (GAO
Report, 1984, p.l)
While it is not suggested that the DOD standardization
experience or emphasis is identical to that of private
firms, the examples are, however, indicative of the
standards advocate's frustration in proving financial
legitimacy. A standards manager for the firm will promote
standards application for the most efficient consumption of
raw materials, the most efficient manufacturing procedures
and the production of goods with the greatest market
potential. DOD, on the other hand, will strive for the same
ideals of efficient consumption and use of materials in
hopes of attaining the greatest output. While the
organizations are quite different, the focus of
standardization activities, and the burden of proving
worthiness in both cases are quite similar.
Over twenty years ago a panel, chaired by Frank La Que
reviewed the US National Standards Program for the
Department of Commerce. In their report they addressed the
difficulty in providing economic justification for
s tandards .
The National Aerospace Standards Committee responded for
the aerospace industry and found itself hard pressed, as
did other industry associations to provide specific
tangible figures on cost reduction or cost avoidance.
(Toth, 1984, p. 77)
The report went on to further state that: (1) there
exists no method for uniform determination of benefits or
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costs of standards and, thus, (2) there exists no sound
basis for making intelligent technical, economic or logistic
trade-off decisions.
.in the absense of any guidelines or uniform gross
measures. . .each individual organization is forced to
color its decisions by its limited and often parochial
interest and knowledge in the area. This action often
results unknowingly in failure to serve the best interests
of the individual organization as well as the overall
industry of which it is a part. (Toth, 1984, p. 77)
Although standards have been positively affecting
industry for hundreds of years, economic evaluation
methodologies for them were not developed until very
recently. Because of this, standards departments have
enjoyed inconsistent endorsement and have provided easy
targets for funding cuts. Standards may affect a firm's
p rof i t ibi 1 i ty and they may (if offered externally) affect
others' profits. The internal generation and application of
standards should be economically evaluated by the firm
itself. The external effects should be judged not only by
the firm, but also on a more grand scale, the methodology
for which will discussed in the next section.
For the individual firm or the standards department
within the firm, the major hurdles to be overcome involve
first proving that meaningful analysis of standards is
possible and second, that the estimates for savings are
believable. While the specific areas for cost and benefit
identification will be discussed below, the point of this
discussion is that a firm should pursue the most efficient
57
as well as the effective standardization practices. The
standards it develops either for internal or external use
must be economically evaluated in some systematic manner.
If the individual firm does not produce economically optimal
standards, it will operate at a potential disadvantage in
the marketplace. Only through systematic studies can the
firm determine the best course of action and compete
effectively.
B. STANDARDS AND THE CONCEPT OF A PUBLIC GOOD
Cost/benefit analysis of standardization should take
place, not only on the level of the firm, but also in a much
larger sense for society as a whole. While an individual
company will attempt justification of its efforts to
standardize and measure the effects of the standards it
creates, so too should industry or even society overall.
Are there too few or too many standards for innovation and
growth? Furthermore, economists should determine what
affects the level of standardization (or the number of
standards) in an industry, and what forces enable or
preclude the industry from reaching the optimum level.
None of the articles which were reviewed for this study
satisfactorily addressed this issue. Nevertheless,
information is available in economic literature which,
though not specifically applied to standards could be used
as a theoretical foundation. It begins with reference to
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voluntary standards as 'public goods'. Next, this reference
is supplemented by the idea that the benefits and the costs
can be summed for public goods decisions and that optimum
decisions are possible.
Economists define a public good such that (1)
consumption of the good is nonrival (one person's
consumption does not diminish the amount available to
another person), or (2) it is infeasible to exclude an
individual from consuming the good, once the good is
provided .
Peter Steiner further defines a public good as "any
publicly induced or provided collective good." Collective
goods arise whenever a segment of society collectively wants
and is willing to pay for a different selection of goods and
services than the market on its own will produce. The
public good may be publicly or privately provided. Co-ops,
trade unions, car pools are all examples of private groups
organizing in response to collective demands. Also there
are degrees of publicness of goods. Not all the goods
produced by the state are purely public, while some goods
produced privately may be purely public.
It is possible to distinguish three types of public
goods: (1) Those arising from intrinsic characteristics of
specific goods that result in hard to market externalities
such as the beauty or ugliness of an office building, (2)
Those arising from imperfections in the market mechanism
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(rather than in the nature of the goods themselves), and (3)
Those arising, not from specific goods but from aspects
concerning the quality or nature of the environment.
(Haveman and Margolis, 1970, pp. 21-26)
Standards, though not consistent with the entire idea,
would fall into the second category. Standards emerge from
imperfections in the market. Peter Steiner in his text,
The Public Sector and the Public Interest states;
Efficient markets frequently suppose adequate information,
sufficient competition, timely adjustment, and modest
transaction costs. The absence of any of these may create
motives to replace market determination by market
provision or to supplement markets with ancillary public
goods. (Haveman and Margolis, 1970, p. 29)
This notion of standards as a public good is supported
if one evaluates the market in which standards are used.
One assumption which most make in studying a competitive
market is Perfect Information. That is, perfect information
exists among buyers as to the quality and ingredients of the
product. But perfect information is more of a myth than a
likely description of reality.
For information to be perfect in the market, it would
have to be free. Product information would, itself be a
public good. This is obviously not how most markets
operate. Information collection, processing and
dissemination can be very costly. The more complex the
product, the more expensive the information.
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Therefore, because product information is not a free
good and is not automatically available to buyers, devices
have arisen to help provide it. Advertising, brand names,
guarantees, specifications and standards are all mechanisms
designed to provide information. These information sources
may not, however, be unbiased and several may be required to
present a balanced menu on any particular product. Of these
devices to better disseminate information, standards which
gain consensus and wide application, forfeit the ability to
direct the benefits exclusively back to the firm which
crea ted them
.
Peter Sassone and William Schaffer in their cost/benefit
analysis handbook state that since no one can be excluded
from consumption, it would follow that no firm would find it
profitable to produce these goods. Therefore, they
continue, " . . .it is indeed possible to simultaneously
observe a demand for some good and an absence of firms
willing to supply the good." (Sassone and Schaffer, 1978, p.
90)
A vacuum was thus created for adequate dissemination of
information in the market place. Professional associations
and trade groups formed to fill the vacuum and supply the
public goods. In most countries the government has taken
this responsibility. In the US, where government
involvement has always been a last resort action upon
failure of the private sector, the responsibility has been
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more private or shared. Standards in the US, as a result,
are generally created by the state only upon failure of the
voluntary system to provide them, or upon the states failure
to recognize standards which already exist.
C. EFFECT VALUATION
The above discussion is an attempt to make one distinct
point: That voluntary standards can be viewed as 'public
goods,' even though they are products of non - go vernmen ta
1
bodies. With this view of standards as more than
engineering articles of design and production which benefit
only the firms that create and use them, the next point
arises. Standards affect society in a number of ways.
Identification and valuation of those effects is the first
and most difficult task.
Once the concept of a standard as a public good is
accepted, the creation of a standard can be studied on a
macro level in the same light as a public policy decision.
As with any policy decision, especially public policy, there
exists various degrees of attributable results. There are
direct, tangible results which usually represent the purpose
behind the policy. There may also be direct, intangible
results, such as improved customer satisfaction, feelings of
nationalism or community, etc. Further, there may be
indirect, unintended results (externalities) which may also
be tangible or intangible.
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The effects both intended and unintended may accrue only
to those within an organization, or they may accrue to
everyone involuntarily. The effects may benefit an
individual, or represent a cost to him. The application of
the public goods concept highlights two distinct features of
standards. Although the user benefits from the consumption
of a public good, others may be positively or negatively
affected by the externalities and not compensated. Thus,
the important characteristics of standards are (1) the joint
products associated with the standard's use, and (2) the
absense of markets to capture these effects.
In short, there exists a wide range of possible outcomes
to a policy decision. It is generally agreed that the most
demanding aspects of Cost/Benefit Analysis, and therefore
policy decisionmaking, is the identification and valuation
of these effects.
The most complicating characteristic of an effect is the
degree to which it may or may not be readily translated to
other physical, countable units. If an effect cannot be
easily converted to some other measurable unit, it is
considered incommensurable.
Some economic theorists believe that truly
incommensurable effects of a policy, while not being
ignored, should not be the focus of much attention or
valuation effort. The elaborate formulas with constraints
and factors to accomodate various situations result in
63
valuations that are too subjective and controversial for
scientific use. For these writers concentration on the
tangible benefits with conservative, responsible valuation
methods will earn the analysis credibility and acceptance.
Other economists take the opposite approach. To them
there are no truly incommensurable effects. "Every outcome
has a social cost and hence, a shadow price." (Sassone and
Schaffer, 1978, pp. 34-35) Shadow prices are "taken to be
any tenuously reasonable ascription of value to a good not
traded in the market." (Thompson, 1983, p. 40) An example
would be measuring the fear of crime by the amount spent on
crime prevention devices. However, the market prices paid
may prove to be an inconsistent meter, because of the
individual's ability, not willingness to pay.
Somewhat of a middle course in dealing with
inc ommens urab 1 e s is to include them in a non-quantitative
manner. Listing the effects and making note of their
importance, without applying valuation formulas, is a more
easily defensible method of analysis.
Therefore, an analyst can either attempt valuation of
difficult to measure effects, or he may simply value the
effects he can readily translate. Once he has determined
the relative costs and benefits for the decision options, he
can proceed to select the best option.
Whether performed in a conscious, systematic manner, or
informally, there must in each case be a weighing of
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alternatives and a measuring of effects along a common
scale. Industrial standardization will inevitably be
measured in terms of money. While the value of a standard
to a firm may be determined in a number of ways, the value
to the industry should be a summation of the individual
interests. Therefore, some guidelines for valuation should
emerge if the industry is to select the most valuable set of
standards. None of the texts, including the major standards
organization operating manuals mentioned a set of guidelines
employed by an industry to value the effects of a standard.
D. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF STANDARDIZATION
Although Robert B Toth in his book, The Economic s of
Standardization
,
outlines a systematic methodology for
valuation of the effects of standards, most of the other
publications which were reviewed simply list the benefits
and costs potentially involved. Furthermore, in addition to
the lack of valuation effort, the effects which were
specified seem to suggest that most standards writers value
in monetary terms the tangible outcomes, and simply list the
intangible ones. Therefore, particularly on the cost side,
the effects of the standardization process is (costed)
valued by the money spent to create them.
Economic theory yields a more broad foundation for
identifying the costs of such decisions, but not necessarily
a more useful one. There exists three economic concepts
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which complicate the valuation problem: market
imperfections, hidden costs and opportunity costs. The
imperfect markets present the valuation difficulty where the
prices paid may not be indicative of the actual value or the
actual cost. Since rich firms would generally pay more for
the same benefit than poor firms, programs affecting only
the rich may incorrectly appear more valuable to society.
The ability to pay, not the willingness or desire may bias
the measure of specific items and may dramatically
understate their value.
In an industry of many different sized firms, but one in
which desire for effective standardization is somewhat
universal, the expenditures of the largest firms to either
create standards internally or through standards
organizations does not yield an accurate measure of their
worth. The cost of a standard may be misstated if one looks
entirely at the expenses of the engineering staff which
writes it. Further, a standard should not be viewed as
worthless to a particular firm, simply because it did not
participate in its creation. The concept of imperfect
markets, therefore, does not allow the measure of a
standard's worth to be a summation of the costs of its
inpu ts
.
The concept of hidden costs are generally associated
with the unintended effects or the externalities of a
standard. Hidden costs of social policies or public goods
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decisions are a topic of tremendous scope by themselves. An
important example of one type of hidden cost is outlined by
C Bongers in Standardization; Ma thema tica 1 Me thods in
As sor tmen t De termina t ion . He calls this 'cost "adaptation
loss" which represents the intangible disbenefit from the
acquisition of an (imperfect) standard material or product,
instead of a (perfect) tailored material or product.
A simple shoe example will help clarify matters. If a
man's feet are between shoe sizes 10 1/2 and 11, he must
choose between two incorrect sizes. If he selects a 10 1/2
or an 11, the discomfort he experiences is an adaptation
loss. While this is a simple illustration, it nevertheless
demonstrates the cost concept.
How such an adaptation loss is valued is not easily
determined. Shoes are again a ready example. If the same
man could have purchased hand-made, tailored shoes, he would
have no size discomfort (adaptation loss), but he would pay
more. The difference in price could be viewed as the value
of the loss. However, once the example is expanded to more
complex products, the loss is more difficult to identify and
value
.
By taking this idea further, Bongers states that two
objectives of standardization are, therefore, the
minimization of the total consumer adaptation loss, and
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equal distribution of the adaptation loss throughout the
standardized items. (Bongers, 1980, pp. 23-25)
Consumers, however, do not bear these costs alone. For
a firm engaged in manufacturing, this adaptation loss can be
illustrated in the standards it creates for the raw
materials utilized in production. Standards in this case
should define the characteristics of raw materials in order
to minizime the costs of irregularities, but without making
such inputs unreasonably scarce and thus too expensive.
Opportunity cost is another important aspect of the
standardizing process to be considered. The cost of a
standard, through this rationale, is not only the amount
spent to develop the standard, but also the foregone options
which might have been employed with those funds. This is an
interesting concept in that standards departments of firms
must not only decide which standard to develop among
alternatives, but the firm must also decide whether funding
for the department is warranted. The other foregone
opportunities are, or should be, important considerations if
optimizing standards activities exist. When opportunity
costs are not considered, inappropriate or
over s tandard iza tion is a likely result.
The intangible costs of standards are, in most cases,
directly related to inappropriate or over specification.
Although these costs are hidden, they may often result from
failure to adequately assess the best option of standards
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expenditures. Thus, failure to minimize the opportunity-
cost may aggravate the unintended negative outcomes. Unlike
the adaptation loss example, most of these costs are
difficult to value. Loss of or slowed innovation from
inappropriate standards and obsolescence cost from old
standards are typically cited.
Theoretically, if a standardizing body is functioning
correctly and is thus pursuing the optimal standards, the
opportunity and hidden costs are minimized. For the money
spent to develop and apply a standard, no alternative exists
which will reap equal or greater benefits or cost less for
the user public to adopt. Further, because of the many
interests involved in a standards organization, the hidden
costs or externalities will be anticipated and minimized.
The foundation of such an organization in theory should rest
upon wide participation from all affected parties
(government, consumers, labor, and industry), each
attempting to minimize their cost from a standard and
maximize their benefit.
Correct standardization would involve zero cost in
slowed innovation and correct review would involve zero
obsolescence cost. The source of cost which remains is the
focus of most costing efforts--the standards organization
operating costs.
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Figuring the cost of voluntary standards organizations
are, like all other aspects of this study, difficult to
bound. One reason is because of the close link between
product standardization and product development. Another
reason is the private, guarded nature of research and
development and the public nature of gaining consensus.
Members of voluntary organizations come to meetings with
a wealth of knowledge and experience which was not acquired
free of charge. Therefore, the cost of the standards
achieved from voluntary meetings are not the travel and
accommodation expenses. The costs are much greater. One
major standards organization studied the problem and
concluded that participants annually spend ten times the
organization's total budget. (NSPAC, 1978, p. 13)
For the individual firm engaged in standards creation
the cost definition is much simpler. Most breakdowns of
expenses involve fixed and variable costs of (standards)
production. The fixed costs include the maintenance of the
standards libraries, the membership dues to the voluntary
organizations, the training of the standards department
staff, the training of the firm's management to use the
standardizing process, and the supervision of the standards
depar tment
.
The variable costs would be directly related to the
number of standards developed. These would include
expenditures associated with particular standards, the
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coordination activities, seminars, and announcements.
Variable costs can be further broken down into the more
detailed aspects of a standard's creation; development,
presentation, implementation, and revision. Development
would include preparation, analysis, and research.
Presentation would be promotion and publishing costs.
Implementation would involve retooling, production and
inspection costs.
Determining the operating costs of a standards
department in a firm is not difficult, nor is the
identification of purely operating expenses for voluntary
standards organizations. Nevertheless, these expenses are
not the only costs of standardization. They are simply the
easiest to see. By not attempting to measure the intangible
costs or identifying the opportunity costs, an inappropriate
standard could be applied and a suboptimal level of
standardization could be promoted.
Many of the standards texts have presented extensive
lists and discussions of the benefits which accrue from
appropriate standardization. The advantages are the focus
of much attention. Correctly applied standards do indeed
produce substantial advantages in nearly every product field
in which the are involved. The National Aerospace Standard
1524 which will be discussed in greater detail below, lists
52 tangible and intangible factors which the industry
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considers significant in calculating the standardization
savings. While the list of generally accepted benefits
of standards is exceptionally long, the most often cited
tangible effects include lower costs of design, production,
storage, transportation and capital investment. The
intangible side is much larger and includes such vague
notions as common language, greater user confidence,
improved organization integration, and better consumer
unders tanding
.
Robert Toth split the tangible benefits into four
primary areas: (1) avoiding costs of specifying new items,
(2) realizing larger discounts from larger orders, (3)
reducing the number of orders, and (4) reducing the
inventory and inventory carrying charges. In short, these
cost avoidances come from variety reduc t ion- - fewer parts
to design, produce and store. The economic relationship
between a larger volume activity and a lower per unit cost
is well documented.
An excellent illustration of these benefits in a
specific product line occurs in Appendix C of Governmen t
Procurement of Semiconductors
,
an industry association white
paper. In the report, the per unit cost of mass produced
transistors in 1985 was estimated at one thousandth of a




The semiconductor industry is characterized by increasing
returns to scale of production. The increasing returns
are due to economies based on experience. . .
Specifically, average cost per unit of output declines as
cumulative production increases. More precisely, as
cumulative production is increased by a fixed percentage,
the cumulative average cost is reduced by a fixed rate.
Average costs decline because workers become more familiar
with specific production processes and tend to do them
more efficiently. At the same time many improvements
will be made in the way- the production process is organ-
ized and performed. (Semiconductor Industry Association,
1985, Appendix C)
In the illustration the economic concept is called the
learning curve . This notion was first expressed in the
1930's for airplane production and generalized in theory in
the mid 1960's. It is now a widely accepted idea and one
commonly expressed by standardization advocates.
The benefits which are associated with the learning
curve are most important because they are measurable. In an
atmosphere of evaluation where only the (tangible) operating
costs of standards activities are included in the negative
side, the reduced per unit cost of production (tangible
benefit) may provide the only hard comparative data
accumulated. Therefore, if justification of standards is
based purely on tangible effects, correct and thorough use
of learning curve statistics is vital.
Nevertheless, as was mentioned, the majority of effects
of standards (and, thus of the benefits) are intangible.
Some are quite significant. Examples taken from NAS 1524
include; Improved general communication, Improved user and
customer confidence, and Improved mechanization.
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While the effects of standards are diverse and often
difficult to ascertain, the better the effort to nail down
and specifically value them, the better they can be judged
against one another.
E. THE CONCEPT OF COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Evaluation of public policy in a systematic manner is an
old concept. Sassone and Schaffer define the process as "an
estimation and evaluation of net benefits associated with
alternatives for achieving defined public goals." (Sassone
and Schaffer, 1978, p. 3) Cost/benefit analysis is an
extension of economics as a social science dealing with
behavior. How a man, a firm, or society chooses to employ
scarce resources is the essence of CBA.
One of the first formal cost/benefit studies of a public
policy occurred in 1667 in London, when Sir William Petty
estimated that expenditures to combat the plague would
achieve a benefit to cost ratio of 84 to 1. The first
publication of the methodology occurred in 1844 with the
Frenchman, Jules Dupuit's essay, On the Measurement o f the
Utility of Publ ic Works .
In the US such studies date from the early 1900's. The
first formal study was the result of Congressional interest
in public expenditures in the RIVER AND HARBOR ACT of 1902,
and later in the FLOOD CONTROL ACT of 1936. Until the
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mid-1960's the majority of such studies were conducted by
the US Army Corps of Engineers. (Thompson, 1983, p.l)
The FLOOD CONTROL ACT stated that benefits "to
whomsoever they may accrue" of federal projects should
exceed costs, but no consistent methods were developed to
examine or identify the benefits. In 1950 a Congressional
Subcommittee on Benefits and Costs of the Federal
Interagency River Basin Commission issued Proposed Practices
for Econom ic Ana lysis o f River Basin Projects
,
but the
guidelines were never formally adopted. In 1952 the Bureau
of the Budget issued Circular A-47 which became the
official, if seldom used guidance.
Later in 1962, Senate Document 97, Policies , S tandard s
,
and Procedures in the Forma t ion , Eva lua t i on and Review of
Plans for Use and Development of Wa ter and Related Land
Resources
,
became the official policy statement. There
exist today various guidelines concerning the performance of
CBA in the public sector.
CBA in this context is an application of a field within
the broader scope of economics, known as Welfare Economics.
The study of welfare economics employs the concepts of
1 we 1 1 -of f nes s ' and public policy decisions effects on
individuals. In this realm there are four criteria for
evaluating economic activity.
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Unanimity - -Economic State 1 is judged to be social
superior to Economic State 2, if each member of society
judges 1 superior to 2.
Pa re to Superiority— Economic State 1 is judged to be
socially superior to Economic State 2, if at least one
person judges 1 superior to 2, and no one judges 2 superior
to 1
.
Majority Rule- - E conomi c State 1 is judged to be
superior to Economic State 2, if the majority prefer 1 to 2.
Po ten t ia 1 Pareto Superiority --(also known as the
Kaldor-Hicks c r i te r i a ) - - Ec onomi c State 1 judged to be
socially superior to Economic State 2, if those who gain can
compensate those who lose so that no one would be worse off
in the final state. (Sassone and Schaffer, 1978, pp. 6-9)
Other economic concepts which are fundamental to CBA are
Externalities, Effect Valuation, Compensating Variations and
Consumer Surplus. An Externality or as discussed above, a
hidden cost, is an effect of a policy decision which is
incidental or unintended, or for which there does not exist
a market. Also known as side effects, spill-overs or
neighborhood effects, these consequences may be significant
and require policy adjustment, or they may never accumulate
in importance to affect the decisionmaking process. Effect
valuation is the methodology of assigning monetary values to
the effects of a policy. Even though the majority of the
benefits or costs of a public policy may be intangible, an
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effort must be made to value the effects in a systematic
manner. The more complete and justifiable the valuation,
the better the CBA
.
For the beneficiary of a program, a Compensating
Variation is the amount of money a person would pay to have
a program and be just as well-off as when he had no program
and had no payment. For a non-beneficiary, a CV is the
amount of money a person would have to be paid so that with
a program and the payment, he would be just as well-off as
without the program and without the payment. A Potential
Pareto Improvement represents a public policy change where
the positive effects outweigh the negative ones. If all the
positive and negative CV ' s are added and the total is
greater than zero, a Potential Pareto Improvement exists and
the policy change should be adopted.
The Consumer Surplus is the amount a user of the policy
(or standard) would be willing to pay for a good, or a
service less its cost to him. Compensating variation is
simply an alternative definition or variant of consumer
surplus. Jules Dupuit originated the concept of Consumer
Surplus. He asserted that the output of a project
multiplied by its price was equal to the minimum social
benefit of the project. Some consumers are willing to pay
more than the market price and thus enjoy excess utility or
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consumer surplus. By definition, this surplus would be a
positive CV.
Once standards which are created by voluntary
organizations are accepted as public goods, and costs and
benefits of these goods' introduction to the market have
been systematically valued, the formal process of CBA may
begin.
F. COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS MODELS
Before analysis is undertaken, there are several key
aspects of the standardization process which must be
recognized. The purpose of the analysis is to ensure the
most efficient use of scarce resources, and to identify the
region of diminishing returns for a specific effort.
Analysis is a tool and not an end in itself. Analysis is
most helpful when the economic effects are not obviously
trivial, the effects can at least be roughly measured, and
the technical arguments and the basic need of the standard
are not overwhelming.
The benefits realized often take the form of 'negative
money'; cost avoidance, money not spent, materials not
handled, time not used. Finally, the effect of a standard
can be realized by groups other than production and design
and can be valued in a number of ways.
Once the difficulties of effect identification and
valuation have been resolved, there emerge several
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alternative approaches for evaluation. Maximization of Net
Benefits, Minimization of Costs, Benefit/Cost ratios, and
Cost Effectiveness are all typically cited models.
In a general sense, performance of any Cost/benefit
Analysis follows a rough procedure:
(1) Define the problem
(2) Designate or design the type of analysis to be
utilized
(3) Collect the data, measure the effects
(4) Conduct a social impact analysis
(5) Conduct a quantitative analysis
(6) Prepare the results
(Sassone and Schaffer, 1978, p. 157)
The social impact analysis considers all the intangible
benefits and costs to view any overriding considerations.
A.J. Schearer refers to this aspect as the 'Qualitative
Approach.' The hard data are reserved for the tangible,
measurable effects, while the intangibles are not ignored.
The formal framework for CBA involves comparison of at
least two states of society (one with and one without a
program). To measure the effects of a program, the
following simple theoretical example is offered.
A state is equal to a specific distribution of utilities
in a society of N individuals. U^ is equal to the
j th persons' utility for state i
S, = ( uj , U* , . . . U* ) and S^ = ( l£ , U* , . . . U* )
State 1 is considered better if S > S
z
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A project is a set of actions (creation of a public good)
which will Lead society from one state to another. The
value of the project would be the difference between the
utilities in each state for the individual and the summed
differences for society. V is equal to the value of the
project to the j th person.
Vj = u; u'
Vj (which is greater than zero) would be the maximum
amount as individual would be willing to pay to have
a project, (a positive CV).
Vj (which is less than zero) would be the minimum amount
an individual would accept as payment to be just as
well-off as in the prior state, (a negative CV).
Vj (equal to zero) implies the individual is indifferent
to the project's adoption.
Suppose the only effects of the project are an increase in
production of Good X (AX) and a decrease in production of
Good Y (AY). Prices P
x ,
Py remain unchanged.
For the individual j, the value of the project is equal to
the price of X times the change in X minus the price of Y
times the change in Y.
V =P/X-Pr4 Y
The social value for the project (V) is the summation of










If V is positive, the policy should be adopted. The
demands for a policy (a collective good) are in this
analysis, complimentary and not competing. The summation
of demand greater than zero is a Potential Pareto
Impr o vemen t- -a better state of society. (Sassone and
Schaffer, 1978, pp. 48-49)
While its applicability to actual situations is limited,
this, nevertheless, represents the quantitative
specification of the Potential Pareto improvement concept
introduced above. The two most blatantly overlooked
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elements involved in the procedure are income re-
distribution and efficiency. If either of these
considerations is overwhelming, CBA should not be used.
By translating the Potential Pareto Improvement concept
into a more workable formula, the idea of Net Benefits
arises. In actual performance, application of the Net
Benefits approach is the simplest. With this method total
investment and operating costs of a standards activity are
subtracted from the revenues which are generated. The
process advocates only programs which, in effect pay for
themselves. If two competing programs are compared, the one
with the highest Net Benefits is preferred.
Another variation of the analysis is Benefit to Cost
Ratio or Return on Investment. The annual revenues which
accrue as a result of the policy (standard) are divided by
the monetary investment in the effort. The resultant ROI
figure can be an excellent gauge of a program, or it can be
of little, or no help at all. If two alternative programs
(standards) are under consideration, the option with the
largest ROI is not necessarily the better. While any
candidate policy for adoption should have a ratio exceeding
1:1, the magnitude of the revenues and costs must also be
taken into account.
Robert Toth has estimated the ratios for typical medium
technology level manufacturing firms at about 7:1, and high
tech firms between 10:1 and 20:1. For specific firms he
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estimates the standardization ROI for Dupont at 4:1 and for
Martin Marietta at 7:1. (Toth, 1984, p. 5)
Therefore use of the Net Benefits and ROI methods should
follow two guidelines. First, only programs to be
considered should have positive Net Benefits and an ROI
greater than 1:1. Secondly, for selection of alternatives
among mutually exclusive, competing programs, that with the
highest Net Benefits is preferred. It is also important to
realize that for any one project, several methods of
analysis should be used in determining its social value.
For qualitative as well as quantitative analysis,
certain rules should be followed in the accumulation of
data. The relationships of costs and benefits to the policy
(or standard) are not always clear or indisputable.
Therefore, the more conservative and supportable the
individual cause and effect assumptions, the more widely
accepted the data will be. In addition, reasonableness and
currency of the data are essential. Common attacks against
policy evaluations originate in incorrect assumptions of
cause and effect.
When this reasonableness cannot be established and
intangible costs and benefits are not numerically
considered, Cost Effectiveness is an alternative method of
analysis. There are several variations.
In CEA the object is to either maximize the benefits
subject to a cost constraint, or to minimize the cost for a
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given level of benefits. In these cases it is important for
the incommensurab les to be displayed and their non-market
nature discussed.
CEA is a valuable tool to determine whether an objective
is worth achieving, and how alternative objectives might be
achieved. Also CEA indexes provide a basis for comparison
of alternative proposals. Cost effectiveness indexes can
take many forms. For standardization, an index might be the
dollar amount spent for standardized parts divided by the
total spent of all parts.
Toth expresses CEA of specific standards as summarized
in two ways: (1) variety reduction, and (2) the
implementation factor. The number of varieties before
standardization divided by the number after will provide a
reduction ratio useful for comparison. The implementation
factor is a measure of the actual utilization of a standard
after a reasonable period for implementation versus the
expected utilization at the time the standard was developed.
Other authors have used different cost effectiveness
ratios, but all are aimed toward evaluation of the money
spent and the outcome achieved, a large part of which being
incommensurable. CEA is generally less aggressive than CBA,
but in certain instances just as valuable. For any project,
there may be several ratios to be considered, with no one
specific measure the best in all cases.
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There exist many other economic tools for evaluating
standards activities. Net Present Value is applicable
because of the very nature of standardization. Incurring
expenses now for anticipated future benefits represents the
character of standards creation and is the essense of NPV
compu ta t i ons
.
NPV = Be - Cfl /(l + d)° + B, - C /(1+d) +. . .+ B - G /(1+d)"
C
e
= dollar cost of the project in time
B&
= dollar benefit of the project in time
d = d i s coun t rate
n = life of the project
Cut off period is a concept for either accepting a
program, if it will pay for itself in a specified period, or
not accepting it. In a rapidly changing technical field
this method may be particularly useful. Payback period is a
closely related concept which compares projects on the basis
of time required to recover costs. While either of these
methods may be helpful, both ignore certain important
aspects and may be somewhat shortsighted. In any event, the
break even point for an activity should be figured if
standardization revenue is at all measurable.
If the benefits are not commensurable analysis may be
restricted to simple cost minimization. However, without
any observance of the benefits, the evaluation is of limited
value.
As stated above, the study of the US National Standards
Program in 1964 by the La Que panel recommended a systematic
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method for evaluating standards be developed. The responses
from this study are two-fold. First, the Air Force
Institute of Technology created a mathematical model
intended for use by engineers when standardizing electronic
parts. Although it is a simple mathematical model, it is
one which requires a vast amount of difficult to obtain
data. The result is that over 507o of the figures are
estimates, but nevertheless, it is a workable tool. Cost
estimations in such a model must be conservative and readily
defensible. (Toth, 1984, p. 62)
The other source of analysis was the Aerospace
Industries Association which produced document NAS 1524. In
this standard nine formulas are given for determining the
cost/benefit figures. Twenty pages in length, the document
is quite extensive in detailing procedures and even lists 52
tangible and intangible effects of standards.
The purpose of NAS 1524 as stated in the document is to,
.provide uniformity in identification and calculation
of the major identifiable cost avoidance and cost reduction
savings factors resulting from standardization projects.
(Toth, 1984, p. 91)
In pursuit of these factors, the nine formulas which
were actually simple mathematical models are presented to
cover :
- Savings from increased quantity purchases.
- Savings from lessened paperwork and handling.
- Savings from reduced storage requirements.
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- Savings from reduced engineering search time
(reference documents).
- Savings from using a stocked standard part in lieu of
a new des ign .
- Savings from using a stocked standard part in Lieu of
a nonstocked part.
- Savings from using a design standard in lieu of
detailing the data completely on each drawing.
Each of the formulas, when applied to an incident of
standardization will yield a believable dollar savings
figure, only if the estimates used as inputs are defensible,
Nevertheless, the mathematical models are simple to
understand, well thought-out, and flexible.
The fifty two listed tangible and intangible factors of
cost savings are extensive and useful when considering most
standardization activities. The factors are broken down
into broad categories of Engineering, Procurement, Quality
Control, Inventory, Production, Maintenance, and General.
The procedure for using NAS 1524 would be first, an
examination of the proposed standard's effects as aided by
the given list of possible factors. The results of this
examination should be conservatively converted to dollar
figures and applied to the applicable mathematical
equations. The resultant values should then be used as a
suppliment to the other evidence for creating or applying a
standard. The greatest strength of NAS 1524 is that it
establishes a way of thinking about cost savings and
presents ideas or stimulus for managers to exploit.
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NAS 1524 is the most comprehensive methodology for
assessing the impact of standards which was uncovered in the
study. Although Toth reports that NAS 1524 has been widely
circulated and translated to German, French, and Portuquese,
the frequency of its application is not known. While it has
existed as an analytical tool for over 15 years, few other
publications mention it specifically or recommend its use in
evaluating standards. Furthermore, whether NAS 1524 or an
equivalent is used and informally promoted in standards
organizations is also not known. The lack of economic
literature and scientific evaluation does not suggest such
an informal arrangement exists.
Therefore, from the first three chapters several
conclusions can be drawn. First, standards play a
significant role in the economic success of industry, yet
they are not the focus of extensive economic studies.
Second, while the effects of standards appear throughout
society, they remain difficult to identify and value.
Concepts and methodologies exist, but are preliminary in
development and even these are not widely cited in standards
literature. Finally there exists in economic literature a
basis for developing cost and benefit analysis models
specifically for standards which may be utilized in pursuit
of optimal choices.
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IV. STANDARDIZATION IN ACTION
The final chapter of this study is a summary of the
standardization activities of the organizations which are
the major contributors to the voluntary system. The
organizations chosen for study are SAE, ASTM, and ANSI.
Although they represent three of the largest and most
influencial groups involved in the standards system, they
utilize three distinctly different methodologies for solving
or coping with the same economic and social conditions.
A. WHO WRITES STANDARDS?
As was previously stated, the system of standards
creation in the US is somewhat unique. The voluntary
organizations and the lack of government direction and
control produce a complex system where virtually no product
or service area is untouched. There are over 400 standards
organizations which belong to the federation known as the
American National Standards Institute, formed for
coordination and standards approval.
While the system may seem cumbersome to outsiders, the
absence of comprehensive, centrally directed planning is
characteristic of the American Government attitude in
general toward the private sector. Mr. Marco Negrete, a
member of ANSI's Board of Directors referred to the European
efforts as more academic than the pragmatic approach used in
the US. Standards here, are developed primarily where there
is sufficient industry interest translated to funding. The
adequacy of the voluntary system forestalls government
involvement. As Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter once
wrote, "Government as a rule undertakes no service or
regulation except after private agencies have proven
themselves incapable or unwilling." (Reck, 1956, p. 34)
According to Dr. E C Crittenden, former Director of the
American Standards Association, the process of voluntary
standardization in the US works for two general reasons: (1)
the desire to maintain a reasonable degree of order in
industry, and (2) the desire to keep the freedom of action
necessary for progress. (Reck, 1956, p. 34)
Benjamin Melnitsky in Pr of i t ing F r om Industrial
S tandardization
,
expresses the motivation as self interest.
Self interest is the dominant factor influencing standards
development by all industrial groups. This is as it
should be and is completely desirable. . . . (Melnitsky,
1953, p. 61)
Since the consumer interest is difficult to organize,
the labor interest often lacks the technical expertise, and
the government prefers a laissez faire policy, this self
interest is most effectively expressed by businesses.
(Hemenway, 1975, p. 86)
Of the 400 organizations outside the government, the
majority produce few standards. The major standards groups
produce almost all of the documents and the major companies
89
which support those groups provide most of their voting
members. Therefore, the standards which affect the masses
are in effect created by the business elite in pursuit of
their own self interest.
David Hemenway well illustrates this aspect of the
voluntary standards system.
Not only are companies well represented, since most
engineers are industry employees, but the major firms
tend to dominate the standardization meetings. . . . It is
clear that compared to the large scale enterprise, a
single small firm finds it relatively more costly to pay
the expenses of employees engaged in standards activities.
While the trade associations could help insure that the
interest of the small firm receive adequate representation,
the association itself is probably dominated by the major
firms. (Hemenway, 1975, p. 85)
Hemenway is somewhat critical of the position taken in
the standards organizations by the largest private firms and
he insists that standards are created in those organizations
only when the major firms want them.
When quality standards are created, we can predict that
they will be written at levels that help established,
dominant firms maintain their dominance. (Hemenway,
1975, p. 90)
In 1978 ANSI formed an independent group, the National
Standards Policy Advisory Committee, to study the
effectiveness of the voluntary system. NSPAC concluded the
following: While over 400 standards organizations have been
writing voluntary standards, the procedures of these
organizations vary widely. There are 20,000 US voluntary
standards which could qualify as National Standards, but
only about 9,300 are so approved. And finally, of the tens
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of thousands of firms which benefit from standards, less
than 1000 are carrying the load financially. (NSPAC, 1978,
p. 13)
While the above discussion projects a negative picture
of the standards process, it raises two, almost
contradictory points. The first is Anti-trust. Section 1
of the Sherman Act prohibits combinations or conspiracies
which unreasonably restrict trade. An apparent conclusion
from the Hemenway criticism is that big firms use their
memberships in voluntary organizations to unlawfully or
unjustly force smaller firms to drop out of business, or to
somehow modify their behavior unwillingly. This judgement,
however is not widely shared.
In fact, the contrary is more often cited in standards
literature. Small firms benefit from the efforts of the
larger firms to a greater extent than they are manipulated
or crushed by it. Not one specific instance of a small
firm's failure due to a standard was uncovered in this
res ear ch
.
Therefore, to many standards advocates the use of a
standard represents its value to the small firms, the
industry, and society overall, and wide spread use and
acceptance demonstrates high value.
The American Society of Testing and Materials in a
seminar to discuss the impact of 0MB Circular A119,
emphasized that the best assurance that a standard does not
91
restrain trade is the democratic process within the
organization. An organization which ensures participation
by the most expert people available, where no one dominates,
and everyone is heard will produce standards which promote
rather than restrict trade. The major standards
organizations go to great lengths to demonstrate fair
representation. (ASTM Seminar, 1983, p. 34)
The compromises involved in the process of approving a
standard are key to the process and are an indication of the
objectivity of the outcome, according to Arthur Johnson,
former Chairman of the Standards Council for ASA. He
asserts that the older a standard is the more likely it is
to be founded in objective evidence. Newer standards tend
to be more biased, but because of re - eva lua t ion , they become
more objective with age. (Reck, 1956, p. 150)
Benjamin Melnitsky reinforces this idea, ". . .the
degree to which a standard approaches the unattainable goal
of complete objectivity largely determines its intrinsic
value." (Melnitsky, 1953, p. 12)
Thus the framework for the voluntary system is
established and the criteria for its performance evaluation
is based. Private firms (the majority of which in this case
are large and economically powerful), acting to promote
their individual interests have formed organizations to
create articles which do not unreasonably restrict trade and
which preclude government involvement. The deliberations of
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the standards groups consist of compromises between the
major players and thereby produce 'objective' results.
Although this idea runs counter to traditional democratic
thinking, David Hemenway was one of the few writers in the
study who seriously questioned the practice. Objectivity,
it appears, can be achieved through such organizations with
limited government interference.
The operation of a voluntary organization is similar in
many respects to that of a standards department within a
firm. Several of the standards texts listed the most
important activities as; monitoring other standardization
activities to reduce duplicated effort and maintenance of
complete standards records, coordinating the activity of
experts from various fields, reconciling divergent opinions,
pushing correct standardization and fighting over-
standardization or economically unsound standards.
The following sections outline the activities of the
Society of Automotive Engineers, the American Society of
Testing and Materials, and the American National Standards
Institute.
B . SAE
One of the oldest and most powerful professional
organizations involved in standards development is the
Society of Automotive Engineers. First established in 1905
as the Society of Automobile Engineers, in 1917 they merged
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with the Society of Aeronautical Engineers. Today they have
a membership of over 40,000 professionals from 87 countries.
The priorities of the Society are first, information
exchange, publication of its annual handbook and then the
development of new standards. SAE is a corporation which in
1984 had total assets of over $22.2 million and had an
annual income of $1.6 million. The corporate Board of
Directors employes as its agent a Technical Board, below
which is a strict hierarchical organization. (SAE 1984
Annua 1 Report)
The Technical Board consists of 24 SAE members and a
Board Chairman. Below the Board are first, the standing
committees, formed to carry out the operations of SAE, and
next, the councils, and then the technical committees.
( A p p end ix A
)
The councils are comprised of 7-25 members, appointed by
the Board for three year terms. The technical committees
are formed by the councils as needed and are the workhorses
for the organization. The technical committees develop,
review, maintain and repeal technical reports, the output
(standards) of the Society. The councils define the scope
of the committee activities and appoint a committee
chairman. He, in turn nominates other potential committee
members. The number of participants may vary, depending
upon the specific needs of the committee. The members are
approved by the council, subject to disapproval by the
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Board. These committee participants need not be SAE
members, but the committee taken as a whole must encompass
an 'equitable balance of interests.' In addition, one
member of each technical committee must be an SAE staff
representative who will monitor the committee proceedings
and suspend activity if society by-laws are violated.
Under the technical committees, several other groups may
exist if needed, such as subcommittees, task, forces or ad
hoc committees. The organization under a technical
committee can be quite extensive. (Appendix B) The
principal technical activity and debate takes place in the
technical committees or below.
The objectives of the Society, as translated to
technical committee activity, are to coordinate and utilize
the knowledge and experience of 'parties at interest.'
The end products of the committee's work are offered as
the best judgement of a group technically competent to
deal with problems covered and do not represent an
industry trade position. . . . Over the years, the
extensive use of SAE technical reports clearly indicates
that committee members, working as individuals, do
produce results that are practical and useful to
industry, government and the public. (SAE, 1986,
p. 91)
The theme of impartiality is strongly emphasized
throughout the SAE literature. Balanced membership in the
technical committees seems to be the key. The councils are
directed to s eek interested or affected parties to
participate in the committee activities. In addition, and
most importantly, members of technical committees are
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required to disclose their interest or persuasion. Members
are thus classified in order to better evaluate the balance.
The committee chairman re-evaluates the membership at least
annually to maintain balance.
The output of the committees are technical reports and
are published in the Automotive Eng ineer i ng and/or Aerospace
Eng ineer ing journals. Every report carries the following
s ta t emen t
.
This report is published by SAE to advance the state of
technology and engineering sciences. The use of this
report is entirely voluntary, and its applicability and
suitability for any particular use. . . is the sole
responsibility of the user. (SAE, 1983, Tech Bd Rule 7.7)
Technical reports which are reviewed at least once every
five years are primarily written in terms of performance
rather than design. Further, "it is desirable that
technical reports not contain a reference to sources of
supply of parts or products or the identity of the
manufacturers." When it is necessary to make such a
reference, the phrase "or equivalent" is offerred in
conjunction. During the approval process neither the
council nor the Board will alter in any way a technical
report which has been submitted by a technical committee.
(SAE, 1986, p. 95)
Just as the balance of membership is designed to ensure
objectivity, so to is the voting procedure. In the
committees unanimous agreement is pursued. However, where
this cannot be achieved, "substantial agreement" must be
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reached. Specifically at least three fourths of the voting
members of a committee (with at least one half voting) must
approve the reports and all dissenting opinions must be
aired and resolved. (SAE, 1983, Tech Bd Rule 8)
Consensus means existence of a substantial agreement. . .
and that an objective effort has been made to obtain a
mutually satisfactory resolution of all dissenting
viewpoints. (SAE, 1986, p. 180)
Approved reports are then submitted by the committee to
the council along with all unresolved opinions. The council
will then strive for full agreement and if not achieved will
attempt to resolve disputes. The council can approve (again
by a three fourths vote), disapprove, or refer the report to
the Technical Board (with unresolved dissenting opinions).
Appeals of the process are allowed and are heard by one of
the Technical Board's standing committees. A technical
report will become a published standard when consensus
(three quarters approval) exists in the Board, the council
and the committee and appeals have been adequately resolved
by the Appeals Panel.
Therefore, the objectivity of the standards are
addressed in two important ways. The classification and
balance of participants and the voting methodology and
"mutual satisfaction" of disputes. The point which was
raised by Hemenway concerning the dominance of the major
firms in the organizations, however cannot be dispelled with
respect to SAE. Appendix C indicates a dominance of large
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firms in the SAE Aerospace Council. Nevertheless, such a
configuration of membership interest is not on its face
suspect nor is it unexpected. Without specific evidence of
dysfunctional behavior, especially at the technical
committee or subcommittee level, one must assume the Society
operates in accordance with its own by-laws and achieves a
balanced approach and objective results.
C. ASTM
Soon after the Office of Management and the Budget
issued Circular A119 and thereby defined the government's
policy concerning the voluntary standards system, the
American Society of Testing and Materials conducted a
seminar to discuss its implications. The publication which




raised many important issues and actually
provided much of the stimulus for this study.
According to the then ASTM President W T Cavanaugh, the
Circular, although a significant policy statement, "codifies
what has been going on at ASTM for over 85 years." The
voluntary system in which ASTM is a major player simply
represents a management process for the development of
consensus standards. For this, large numbers of 'general
interest people,' including government employees are
required. ASTM is not a professional organization. Much of
what Cavanaugh said at the seminar was a counter attack to
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the charge of dominance or a justification of ASTM
procedures. The supposed Large firm domination of the
organization appeared to be a point of particular
sensitivity. ". . .for a special interest to dominate ASTM is
just about impossible." As proof Cavanaugh offered that
none of the 30,000 documents issued by ASTM had ever been
challenged in court by another private interest.
Cavanaugh did, however recognize the need for this type
of s cru tiny
.
A standard is an agreed upon way of doing something. The
key question that has to be answered is who agreed and
under what circumstances? Standards can be dangerous
document s ... unles s the thing is done right there can be
many unfortunate outflows. . . . (ASTM Seminar, 1983,
pp. 9-11)
Unlike SAE in some respects, ASTM is a more broadly
based organization, with financial support coming from the
sale of its publications and voluntary contributions. Also
unlike SAE, the creation of standards is the primary mission
of ASTM. Any group is welcome to participate in ASTM and
any private group, commercial activity, or government agency
can ask ASTM to convene a meeting to cover a specific area.
ASTM is an old, well .established organization which
provides significant input into the voluntary system. First
established in 1898 as the American Section of the
International Society of Testing and Materials and four
years later reorganized as ASTM, the society today boasts a
membership of 29,000, 4,000 of which are foreigners. The
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governing body is the Board of Directors whose members are
elected by a vote of the entire membership. Appendix D
illustrates the basic organization of ASTM.
Under the Board of Directors, the Board Committees
consist of Executive, Finance, Society Development,
Technical Committee Activities and the Voluntary Standards
System Committee. These committees report to the Board but
also direct several other subordinate committees and serve
as the Society's administrators. The Standings Committees
maintain and enforce the Society's by-laws and report to the
Board Committees. Potential members of these committees
apply for membership and must be approved by the Executive
Committee. The technical committees are organized under the
direction of the Standing Committees, but then act as semi-
autonomous groups. While the scope of their operation must
be approved by the Board, and the by-laws they draft must be
approved by the COTCO
,
the technical committees are free to
organize subcommittees or task groups below them for
standards creation. Appendix E illustrates a typical
technical committee organization.
The principles by which the Society operates include:
- Timely and adequate notice of proposed standards
development efforts to all materially affected parties.
- Opportunity for all affected parties to participate in
the deliberations and develpment of standards.
- Maintenance of accurate records and accumulation of
complete data on the development of standards.
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- Adequate notice of all proposed actions.
- Distributions of ballots to all those eligible to vote
on standards during the approval process.
- Timely reporting of ballot results
- Adequate appeals procedures made available to all
interested parties. (ASTM Handbook, 1985, p.l)
ASTM strives to produce quality standards, the integrity
of which are based upon consideration and support from a
balanced interest group. To ensure this, technical
committee members are classified as to their interest as
Producers, Users, Consumers or General Interest. The size
of a committee is not limited by regulation, nor is the size
of its subcommittees. The Executive Committee approves or
disapproves applications for membership with an appeals
process under the COTCO. The balance of interest in the
technical committees is precisely defined so that "the
combined number of voting user, consumer and general
interest shall equal or exceed the number of voting producer
members." (ASTM, 1985, Tech Com Reg 7.5)
The Executive Committee will approve applications for
voting membership unless (1) acceptance will create an
imbalance on the committee, or (2) the applicant is not
technically qualified or knowledgeable in the area of the
committee's scope. (Regulation 6.3) If a member changes
employers and thus changes his classification, his
membership may again come under review by the Executive
C ommi t tee
.
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The meetings of technical committees and subcommittees
shall be open to visitors whenever standards are being
discussed but may be closed otherwise.
Therefore, the objectivity in ASTM is first protected by
the balance of interest concept. The voting and approval
process is the next instrument to which the Society refers
as 'due process.' (Appendix F)
The approval procedures take place on four distinct
levels. First the technical subcommittee chairman can
initiate and conduct a letter ballot which must be approved
by at least a two-thirds majority (with not less than 607» of
the eligible voters participating). Negative opinions must
be considered and acknowledged by the subcommittee. To
consider a negative opinion, the subcommittee can do one of
two things. It can convene a meeting to discuss the
negative opinion and can then conduct a vote on it. For a
negative vote to be 'not persuasive' and thus withdrawn,
two-thirds of the voting members must vote 'not persuasive
or not related.' If the negative opinion stands, the
standard is withdrawn from the approval process to iron out
the probl ems
.
The other course of action a technical subcommittee may
take is to simply pass the standard with the negative
opinions to the technical committee for its deliberation and
vote. The committee, after reviewing the standard and the
dissenting views can approve a standard only with a nine
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tenths affirmative vote (with 607. participating). Negative
votes in the committee must again be acknowledged, but only
the opinions not previously considered by the subcommittee
need to be considered by the committee. Again, the two-
thirds vote is required to make a negative vote not
persuasive and allow the standard to continue on the
approval process. Once the negative votes have been
considered and at least two-thirds of the committee
believes them to be not persuasive, a standard may be
presented (with negative opinions) for a formal vote by the
entire Society. (ASTM, 1982, Regulation Section 12)
Letter ballots for the Society are included in the
Society's publication Standardization News along with all
dissenting opinions which were not withdrawn. Each member
of the Society is entitled to one vote. Negative votes from
the members of the Society are again acknowledged and
negative votes not previously considered are then considered
by the committee. Once all negative votes have been
rejected by two-thirds of the committee, the standard can be
submitted to the Committee on Standards which determines
whether due process was followed and consensus was achieved.
Thus, a complicated and obviously time consuming
procedure has been developed to ensure objectivity, for each
voting stage takes a minimum of thirty days. Appendix G is
a summary of the process, the 'Life Cycle of a Standard.'
While the procedures designed to balance the membership and
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provide a detailed due process, the objectivity of such an
organization can still best be judged over time and with
respect to its output. Just as the dominance of council
members by large firms in SAE does not necessarily lead to a
conclusion of biased results, likewise the due process of
ASTM does not necessarily lead to a conclusion of
objectivity. Nevertheless, the lack of legal complaints
over the years tends to support the Society's contention of
fair play and objectivity.
D. ANSI
In 1919 engineers from five existing professional
societies (ASME, ASTM, AIEE, ASCE, AND AIMME) formed the
American Engineering Standards Committee to develop
standards on a national level. In 1928 the Committee
restructered to allow participation of trade associations,
corporations, and government agencies and, thus formed the
American Standards Association. ASA remained until the late
1960's as the primary force behind the national standards
efforts. Both AESC and ASA played an active role in not
only coordinating national standardization efforts of other
groups, but also creating standards, themselves.
The original principles by which ASA operated were
voluntary use, public interest and judicial methods,
consensus, and flexibility. ASA was founded to operate
broadly in the public interest and not merely in the
104
interest of its members. They created standards, the
adherence to which was never enforced, but which were based
upon the consensus of all 'substantially concerned' parties.
Although one of four methods were encouraged, any manner
which demonstrated consensus was acceptable.
According to Arthur Johnson, consensus for ASA means--
.that all who are legitimately concerned with a
project have the right not only to be heard, but also to
be recognized as having competence to contribute their
experience and their op inions ... which cannot be overruled
merely by a majority vote.
Johnson went on to outline the primary concerns of the
drafting committees as:
- the relative weight of specific special interest
par t i c ipants
,
- the relative experience of those casting negative
votes
,
- the economic impact of the standards on those casting
nega t i ve votes,
- the objectivity of the affirmative vote.
(Reck, 1956, p. 150)
The preferred methods for gaining consensus were
Sectional Committees, Existing Standards, General Acceptance
or Proprietory. The Sectional Committee method is very
similar in operation to the technical committee procedure of
ASTM. The Existing Standards method often led to
modifications of de facto standards already in use in hopes
of more widespread acceptance. General Acceptance was
simply a balloting of concerned parties over a standard
being developed. Only Unanimously approved standards were
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passed. Finally, the Proprietory method was reserved for
revisions of existing ASA standards, done by the preeminent
firm in the industry. (Melnitsky, 1953, pp. 72-73)
From 1966 to 1969 a major reorganization transformed ASA
into the American National Standards Institute and
significantly changed its operation. ANSI no longer creates
standards but simply provides a medium through which other
organizations produce national consensus standards. More
stringent guidelines were drawn than used in ASA and more
precise definitions were made to reduce the subjectivity of
operations. Outside organizations which apply for and
receive accreditation then use the structure and procedures
of ANSI to promote their standard and gain national
consensus. (Sullivan, 1983, pp. 22-23)
The ANSI Board of Directors employes an Executive
Standards Council (ExSC) which delegated specific
responsibilities and establishes standards boards and
committees. The boards and committees operate within a
scope assigned by ExSC and act as the Institute's
administrators. The breadth of the organization is quite
wide as over 200 committees now exist.
Approval of standards as American National Standards is
reserved and delegated by the Board of Directors to a Board
of Standards Review. BSR consists of between nine and
eighteen members which are selected by the Board chairman
and approved by the Board of Directors.
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BSR has the responsibility to verify that the due
process requirements of ANSI have been met in the
development of submitted standards and that consensus has
been reached. BSR must be satisfied in these two areas to
approve a standard. Other administrative considerations
include, but are not limited to, evaluation for possible
conflicts with other existing standards, and the affirmation
that the standard was submitted by a group in an area for
which it was accredited. BSR acts only on this basis. BSR
does not judge the technical content of a standard.
While the minimum criteria for due process are specified
by ANSI, actual procedures may vary between groups. An
organization must, first of all, be open to all directly
affected parties.
There shall be no undue financial barriers to
participation. Participation cannot be conditional upon
membership in any organization, nor unreasonably
restricted on the basis of technical qualification. . . .
(ANSI, 1983, Procedure for Development 1.2.1)
The organization must represent a balance of interest
within the scope of accreditation where (1) no more than one
third of the membership of a committee writing safety
standards represents a single interest, and (2) less than
one half of the members writing product standards represent
a single interest. Fair representation in an organization
is assumed unless challenged by an affected party. (ANSI
1983, Procedure for Development 1.2.2)
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To more easily determine the balance, members of
accredited groups or committees must be classified at least
as Producers, Users, or General Interest. More specific
classes may be used if needed such as, but not limited to,
Consumer, Insurance, Labor, Regulatory Agency, or simply
Expert.
In order to provide opportunity for public comment,
proposals for new standards are submitted for publication in
S tandard s Action
,
the Institute's biweekly journal. All
inquires or objections which are then expressed must be
answered or resolved. Finally, an accurate and complete
record must be maintained by the accredited organization of
its proceedings, ballot results and dissenting opinions.
Thus, due process requirements within an accredited
organization are, at a minimum, openness, balance of
interests, publication and wide dissemination, and accurate
record keeping.
For a standard to be considered for approval by ANSI it
must also demonstrate evidence of national consensus. There
are three methods all of which are considered to be
equivalent. The methods are Accredited Organization,
Accredited Standards Committee, or Accredited Canvas.
Using the Accredited Organization method a standards
writing group follows its own procedures which were approved
by ANSI. Upon successful demonstration of consensus at that
level, the organization then submits the standard for ANSI
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review. Since both ASTM and SAE are accredited, one can
readily discover a degree of flexibility in proving
cons ensus
.
Generally to be accredited, an organization must use
approved operating procedures, provide for an appeals
mechanism, cooperate with ANSI with advice on new efforts
and needs, consider applicable international standards, and
provide a summary of votes and responses. Applications for
accreditation are subject to approval after a 'comment
period 1 and reviewed by the Audit and Accreditation Board.
The process takes between three and six months.
Under the Accredited Standards Committee method, a group
of interested parties form a committee to address a specific
standards area. The participants must be sufficiently
diverse to prevent domination and the scope of their
operation must be bounded in their application. They may
either draft their own operating procedures which must pass
ANSI scrutiny, or they may simply adopt a set of ANSI model
procedures. While the same principles of due process are to
be emphasized, either set of procedures must demonstrate
consensus .
Finally, using the Accredited Canvas method, an
accredited sponsoring organization develops a proposed
standard and a list of affected parties. Then using the
ANSI provided canvas technique, the organization polls the
affected parties for approval. Again the dominant
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characteristics of the methodology are the widest
dissemination of information to the affected parties,
resolution of dissenting opinions and an appeals mechanism.
Consensus is, thus, determined by BSR to have been
demonstrated by one of the three methods when 'substantial
agreement' has been reached by the accredited group and a
"concerted effort 1 has been made to resolve disputes.
Actions on standards by BSR require an affirmative vote of
not less than two-thirds of the entire Board. All
proceedings of the Board concerning a standard will be
published in S tandar d s Ac t i on in order to again provide
opportunity for public comment. (ANSI, 1983, BSR Proc. 5)
Appeals can be made on three levels. First, an appeal
should be directed at the accredited organization which
developed the standard. Once this has been exhausted, a BSR
decision can be appealed directly back to BSR. The same
voting rules exist in both cases for the appeals decision.
Finally an appeal can be made to the ANSI Board of Appeals.
In general, consideration of appeals shall be fair and
unbiased, handled expeditiously, with the right of all
involved parties not denied and without any undue burdens.
Through these procedures ANSI provides a medium for
other voluntary organizations to widen the applicability of
their standards and receive national recognition and
acceptance. ANSI employs the common principles of balanced
110
participation, wide, free exchange of information,
resolution of dissent and consensus.
In addition to these activities ANSI manages and
coordinates US participation with foreign standards groups
and is the official US member in the International Standards
Organization. As a clearinghouse and information center for
American Standards, it maintains effective interface with
the government on standards issues by giving advice,
counsel, and testimony before Congressional Committees.
In 1978 ANSI formed an ad hoc study group to devise a
National Policy on Standards for the US. The specific
recommendations of the group called for the organization in
the Executive Branch of the Federal Government, a Government
Standards Coordinating Center and in the private sector, a
Private Sector Coordinating Center. The two agencies would
then work together to identify the priority needs of the
nation, coordinate the public and private interests
involved, and, thus more efficiently create the types and
numbers of standards required. ANSI has since modified its
operation to act as the Private Sector Coordinating Center,
but no Federal Government action has been initiated to
create the Government Sector Center.
Ill
V . CONCLUSION
The intention of this study was first, to investigate
the importance of standards to society, consider standards
from an economic perspective, delineate procedures for
evaluating their creation, and finally, discuss actual
organization regulations and operations. There are several
conclusions which can be drawn from the preceding chapters,
and yet many others which may not.
A. CONCLUSIONS
(1) The role of standards in industry and society is
fundamental. The future demand for correctly developed and
applied standards will likely not diminish, but will expand
Furthermore, while the demands imposed upon the
standardizing departments within companies and upon the
voluntary standards organizations will increase, the
appreciation for their work will grow at a much slower pace
Management, not only in private industry, but in government
as well, will continue to view internal standards bodies
with skepticism and will seldom fully fund, or even
adequately fund their efforts. This follows from the
treatment standardizing bodies have received throughout
history.
(2) Standards which are developed and used only within
specific firms, and thus remain private goods, should be
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critically evaluated by the firms individually in order that
economically sound business decisions can be made.
Standards greatly affect the cost of doing business, and
thus deserve the same scrutiny in application as other
inputs of production.
(3) Standards engineers or departments within firms
should attempt to justify their efforts and their expenses
by using a systematic method such as NAS 1524. If these
justifications are not made, standards funding will be
subjected to undeserved restrictions or cuts. These
justifications alone, however, do not guarantee funding
support.
(4) National consensus standards, as well as other
standards which are widely used outside of the firms which
create them, can be viewed as public goods and should be
assessed in terms of their overall effect on the economy.
Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of these
standards can be summed and optimal standards decisions can
be made in a manner similar to that of other public
policies.
(5) The major propellant behind the standardizing
efforts appears to be the enthusiasm and dedication of
relatively few individuals, (few in terms of the multitude
of persons ultimately affected by standards). These people
are to a certain extent silently creating the standards upon
113
which industry and society depend. Although their work is
well known within highly specialized circles of engineers
and designers, it is virtually unknown to the user public.
(6) The four criteria for evaluating economic activity
are Unanimity, Pareto Superiority, Majority Rule, and
Potential Pareto Superiority. In this regard the voluntary
standards organizations are established in by-laws and
regulations in such a way as to arrive at the best economic
decisions. Voluntary organizations strive for Unanimity in
making decisions, but when such cannot be achieved, they do
not simply rely on Majority Rule. Rather the standardizing
groups insist upon the mutual satisfaction of disputes and
the modification of standards to gain the highest possible
consensus. The concept of Potential Pareto Superiority is
entirely consistent with the 'balance of interest 1 and 'due
process' characteristics of the groups. The voluntary
standards system, if used as it was intended, can produce
Potential Pareto Improvements and can create standards which
deliver improved benefits to society.
(7) The accusations of dominance of standards
organizations are irrelevant for several reasons. First of
all, the greatest inhibiter or limit upon the effectiveness
of a voluntary standardizing group is not internal power
struggles or large firm dominance. It is technical
competency. (Negrete interview) As systems become more
complex, the pool of eligible or qualified participants
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shrinks. Private individuals from whatever size firm are
not normally denied access to standards organizations
because of their affiliation, but they may be denied voting
rights because of their lack of ability to intelligently
contribute. The SAE voting requirements are an example.
Organizations which produce national consensus standards
follow regulations which are designed to deny dominance by
single industry or firm interests. They also provide
publication access to knowledgeable contributors and
dissenting opinions. Further, standards organizations are
not immune to anti-trust prosecution. Small firms can thus
voice their opinion, participate in deliberations, vote in
most cases, appeal almost every standard decision, and
presumably seek damages in court for any legitimate
d i sad van tage
.
In final response to the dominance accusation, the
question of who best should create standards arises. Most
major standards organizations stress that members act as
individuals and not as employees of large (or small) firms.
If members are in fact not acting to further the interests
of their firm, but rather are promoting the public interest,
the origin of their membership should not be an issue. If
this is not occurring, and members are voting their company
line, eventually such action will be exposed. But, if legal
contests are not being waged, the system is probably
functioning as designed. Furthermore, if members of large
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firms are not allowed to participate in their present
numbers, who should fill the void? Virtually no one
believes that government is well suited to fill this role.
While it is easy to criticize the membership, it is
difficult to prescribe a better one.
(8) Lastly, in terms of standards as public goods, there
does not exist an easily identifiable measure of
standardizing performance. While individual standards may
be best selected from alternatives to maximize the net
benefits to society, the overall effort and achievement of
standards groups cannot so readily be judged. If one asks
whether SAE is adequately providing the automotive industry
with the best possible array of standards, the answer will
undoubtedly be formed with, at least some, reference to the
Japanese or European auto industries and standardizing
activities. Without (or even with) such a comparative
element, the evaluation of SAE performance is difficult. In
short, there is not an objective or absolute means of
performance evaluation for the voluntary system.
B. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE STUDY
(1) Without doubt the greatest failure of this study
was to uncover a sufficient quantity of recent data or
literature. Beyond the two publications by Robert Toth, the
data available were either specialized or old or both.
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Studies of standards are suprisingly rare, given the
tremendous affect they exert on industrial development.
(2) The review of the standards organizations operating
manuals gives an outsider a descriptive formula for gaining
consensus and creating national standards which may or may
not have anything to do with reality. Just as one cannot
read the Constitution and then critique the work of the
Senate, the obvious missing element of this study was actual
participation or extensive interviews of participants.
(3) At the outset this study was geared toward an
evaluation of mathematical models (such as the one presented
in Bongers' text) which were believed to dominate the
decisionmaking process of creating standards. Whether
mathematics has any relevance to developing standards
cannot, however, be established. Bongers and Toth mention
mu 1 t i -var iab le equations, but none of the voluntary
standards manuals give any direction beyond political
process.
(4) Finally, the analysis made in this study of the
standards decisionmaking process to general economic
concepts is certainly not a refined one. Studies which may
follow may best be directed toward group behavior and social
policy setting in theory, and toward the actual
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